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ABSTRACT
The end of the Cold War has brought about significant changes in the international and
national security environments that present tremendous implications for the US military. The
strategic threat of global nuclear war has diminished considerably. While that threat is
diminished, a new threat is emerging. Ballistic missile proliferation and related weapons of mass
destruction are one of the major threats to stability in the new security environment. Ballistic
missile systems are seen as destabilizing weapons that are a threat to regional peace and
American vital interests in certain regions. This thesis addresses the possible need for theater
ballistic missile defenses in the US Navy as one element of a national strategy to defeat ballistic
missiles in future regional conflicts. Specifically, it addresses the naval role for ballistic missile
defenses, including an analysis of the present and future threat, an examination of how the
missile defenses dovetail into the national security strategy of regional contingencies, and the
means by which the defenses can be employed. The issue of the threat involves demonstrating
that a threat exists and that technological improvements in the future will increase their utility
and put more targets, including US Navy ships, at risk. The issue of the role that defenses fill in
the national security strategy deals with their contributions to the fundamental pillars of that
strategy. The issue of naval roles addresses the missions and tasks that a sea-based system can
provide across the spectrum of naval warfare. The means which the defenses can be employed is
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The end of the Cold War has been the watershed event for changes in the
international and national security environments that present tremendous
implications for the US military. The strategic threat of global nuclear war has
diminished considerably. Yet, while that threat is diminished, a new threat is
emerging. In the new international security system, ballistic missile proliferation
and related weapons of mass destruction are one of the major threats to stability
in the new security environment. Ballistic missile systems are becoming
increasingly prominent in Third World arsenals and are seen as destabilizing
weapons that are a threat to regional peace and American vital interests in
certain regions. This thesis addresses the possible need for theater ballistic
missile defenses in the U.S. Navy as one element of a national strategy to defeat
ballistic missiles in future regional conflicts. Specifically, it addresses the naval
role for theater ballistic missile defenses, including an analysis of the present and
future threat, an examination of how missile defenses dovetail into the national
security strategy of regional contingencies, and the means by which the defenses
can be employed.
The issue of the threat involves demonstrating that a threat presently exists
and that the future threat will be even greater. Today, some twenty nations
either possess or are in the process of acquiring ballistic missiles. These nations
have pursued ballistic missiles for a number of reasons that fall under the
categories of military-strategic, political-diplomatic, and economic reasons. The
majority of the present generation of ballistic missiles in the Third World are
generally conventionally armed warheads that are combined with being
relatively inaccurate. However, they can be quite useful for political reasons and
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psychological terror and can be effective against large area targets and civilian
population centers. In the future the threat from ballistic missiles is likely to
grow due to the development and application of technology. The lethality of the
systems will grow with the development of nuclear, chemical, biological, and
advanced conventional warheads. The range, payload, and overall technical
sophistication of ballistic missiles will continue to improve. Additionally, the
introduction of terminal guidance on ballistic missiles will provide a dramatic
step jump in accuracy to these weapons. These applications will greatly increase
their utility and put many more targets, including U.S. Navy ships, at risk.
The issue of the role that theater ballistic missile defenses fill in the national
security strategy deals with the contributions defenses can give to deterrence,
forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. With defenses, the United
States would have the capability to defeat enemy ballistic missile attacks against
cities, bases, ports, and troops. Ballistic missile defenses can be a part of U.S.
peacetime engagement through forward presence, either on land or sea, and by
being forward deployed, particularly at sea, they can enhance U.S. crisis response
capability. In a crisis, theater ballistic missile defenses could be used to limit
escalation, for offense suppression, and for joint task force and ground warfare
support. Continued research and development can contribute to the United
States maintaining its technological edge over all potential enemies.
The issue of naval roles addresses the missions and tasks that a sea-based
theater ballistic missile defense can provide across the spectrum of naval warfare.
As just one element of U.S. naval forces, theater ballistic missile defenses can
contribute to the operational capabilities needed to successfully execute the new
direction of the Navy and Marine Corps. In doing so, they can provide the task
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force commander a broad area of mission assignments to which they can be
tasked. Working in coordination with land-based systems and space and air
assets, the defenses can provide a theater-wide defense against ballistic missile
attacks. The advantages of a sea-based system lies in the fact that Navy forces
will generally be the first into a crisis region and may have the only on-the-scene
ballistic missile defense capability and a sea-based system has the inherent
mobility that can let them cover assets that a land-based system cannot.
The means by which the defenses can be employed is addressed to
demonstrate how the U.S. Navy can be a major contributor using the Aegis
construct. A major part of the infrastructure is already in place with the Aegis
Combat System. It is cost effective and lower risk because there are already
existing platforms and some existing capability that can be upgraded to provide
an effective theater ballistic missile defense system. There are a number of
software and hardware upgrades that can be made with existing technology
right now that will help improve performance against ballistic missiles. The two
most critical items needed to make Aegis an effective, flexible and mobile theater
ballistic missile defense platform are external sources of cueing and a defensive
warhead with proper guidance and control that can defeat all future ballistic
missile threats. Other potential problems are the 1972 ABM Treaty, declining




The Cold War is over and suddenly the United States finds itself facing
fundamental questions concerning its role in the new world order. Finding the
answers to these questions is made all the more difficult by a domestic
environment that is increasingly pressing for change. This pressure is over
concerns about the US economy and is manifesting itself by calls for the reaping
of a "peace dividend" following the Cold War. The fact that this debate is
ongoing during a presidential election year seems to make the pressure even
more intense. The outcome of this debate will have serious implications for the
national security of the United States and the roles and missions of the US
military.
The US military was not immune from economic or political considerations
even during the Cold War. Issues related to national defense were common
foundations of presidential campaigns, including the supposed "missile gap"
during the 1960 campaign and the issue of US military weakness during the 1980
campaign. 1 In those times the common underlying factor was the threat of the
Soviet Union and the shadow of Soviet nuclear armed ballistic missiles. The
Soviet Union set the boundaries for all debates concerning US national security
and military strategies. The military directed its efforts towards the Soviet threat.
*For further discussion of the impact of political campaigns on defense decisions see
Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy
Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Strobe Talbott, Deadly
Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York and
Toronto: Random House, 1985).
The strategy of containment was clearly necessary during the Cold War.2 Now
that the Cold War is over, the threat from the former Soviet Union has
diminished considerably and has led to the current debate on the purpose, roles
and missions of the US military establishment.
As is usually the case, when one threat fades away, another threat emerges in
its place. In particular, concerns have been raised about the spread of ballistic
missiles. The extensive use of ballistic missiles in the "war of the cities" in 1988
during the Iran-Iraq War and the use of Scud missiles by Iraq against Israel and
Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm highlighted the rapid proliferation of these
weapons, and served as a premonition of worse things to come if and when
developing states deploy ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass
destruction. Ballistic missile systems are becoming increasingly prominent in
Third World arsenals and are seen as destabilizing weapons that are a threat to
regional peace and American vital interests in certain regions. Technological
improvements to those arsenals in the areas of accuracy, guidance and range,
combined with a variety of warheads will make them a more direct threat to the
United States, US forces overseas, its allies, and its vital interests in the not too
distant future.
The United States government has reacted to the changing events and threats
throughout the world, as well as to the concerns of its people, by proposing a
new national security strategy.3 This strategy recognizes the decline of what
^See National Security Council, The Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense on United
States Objectives and Programsfor National Security, April 7, 1950 (NSC-68) (Washington, D.C.:
GrO, 1950); and Mr. X (George F. Kennan), "Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25
(July 1947): 572-82.
^See President, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1991).
remains of the Soviet Union as a threat and recognizes the emergence of new
threats and regional crises as the new focus of US national security concerns. It is
a strategy that translates militarily into a strategy of regional contingencies.
A litmus test of that strategy was the Gulf War which soon followed. The
world watched while a US led coalition showcased its technological and military
superiority over a rogue Third World regional power. However, of major
concern to the US political and military establishment was Iraq's use of ballistic
missiles, especially their possible use with chemical warheads. A major
contributing factor in keeping the coalition together, limiting escalation, and
protecting civilians and military forces was the Army's Patriot missile defense
system in destroying numerous Iraqi Scud missiles over Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Therefore, missile defense showed their utility in regional contingencies.
In the Gulf War, the United States had the luxury of host nation support
from Israel and Saudi Arabia. It also had four months to produce and position
the improved Patriot batteries so they could be used most effectively to defeat
the perceived threat and use of Iraqi ballistic missiles. In the next contingency,
the United States may not have the use of a host nation or the time to preposition
theater missile defenses into the theater on land. That proposition begs the
question of what will protect our introductory forces from ballistic missiles in
such a regional contingency or our vital interests or allies from ballistic missile
attack in an unexpected or rapidly developing crisis? That fundamental question
leads to the purpose of this thesis which is to examine the question: Should the
United States have theater missile defenses at sea and how can they be
employed?
A. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This thesis will examine the possible need for ballistic missile defenses in the
United States Navy. Specifically, it will address the naval role for ballistic missile
defenses, including an analysis of the present and future threat, an examination
of how the missile defenses dovetail into the national security strategy of
regional contingencies and forward presence, and the means by which the
defenses can be employed.
The major threat that this thesis will examine is that posed by Third World
ballistic missiles.4 Chemical, biological and nuclear weapons are also examined
because of the possibility of putting a warhead of that type on a ballistic missile
system. Cruise missiles are not a focus of this thesis but are looked at in the role
they can play in causing tradeoffs in the entire air defense package for a
platform.^
This thesis will also examine the roles that ballistic missile defenses can play
in supporting the national security strategy. In particular, the four major pillars
of deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution, with the
emphasis on crisis response. The approach used in this research has been to
determine the contributions a ballistic missile defense system adds to the ability
of the US armed forces to defend and promote national security interests.
Additionally, some potential problems and tradeoffs are examined to determine
their possible impact on theater missile defense deployment.
^For the purpose of this thesis the term ballistic missile refers to a self-propelled weapon
delivery system that is guided during a portion of its ascent, then follow a ballistic (unguided
and unpowered) trajectory over the remainder of the flight. The more advanced missiles may
also have terminal guidance to direct the weapon to the target.
^Cruise missiles are powered by an air-breathing engine and are generally guided for
their entire flight.
A major question that this thesis will attempt to answer is, should the United
States have theater missile defenses at sea? It will examine the roles that ballistic
missile defenses in the Navy can play in supporting a strategy of regional
contingencies. The approach used in this examination has been to determine
how the Navy can add to a joint ballistic missile defense effort in future regional
contingencies.
The means by which missile defenses can be employed in the Navy will be
done within the context of adapting them to the Aegis defense system currently
on Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Specific
questions to be studied include: What type of upgrades are required for the
radar system? How can external cueing improve the capability for ballistic
missile defense? What type of warhead is needed to defeat the variety of
warhead threats that are likely to be present in the near future? What are some
of the tradeoffs or possible pitfalls that might prohibit defense deployment?
B. METHODOLOGY
The research methodology utilized in this thesis will be to first conduct an
examination of the threat, both present and future, that Third World ballistic
missiles may pose. The roles that naval ballistic missile defenses can fill in the
new national security posture of regional contingencies will then be examined.
Finally a study of the feasibility of the defenses and what is needed to employ a
missile defense system on current Aegis assets. Thus, this thesis can be seen as
one element of the strategic planning process, that theoretically starts with the
enunciation of a threat, that leads to the development of a national military
strategy, and then progresses to the determination of individual elements of that
strategy.
II. NATURE OF THE THREAT
A. PRESENT THREAT
For years, the United States has lived in the shadow of Soviet nuclear
armed ballistic missiles. As the Cold War has ended and tensions between
the United States and the former Soviet Union have eased, the strategic
threat of global nuclear war has diminished considerably. Yet, while that
threat is diminishing, a new threat is emerging. In particular, concerns have
been raised about the spread of ballistic missile systems and technologies to
areas of the world, such as the Middle East, in which there are strong regional
tensions. In the past two years attention has become more focused on ballistic
missile proliferation due to Iraq's arsenal of ballistic missiles, which it used
against Israel and Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm in January and
February 1991, and Iran and Iraq's use of ballistic missiles against population
centers in the 1988 "War of the Cities ".1 Such missiles can have ranges of a
hundred to a few thousand kilometers and can carry payloads of up to one or
two thousand kilograms. Ballistic missile systems are becoming increasingly
prominent in Third World arsenals and are seen as destabilizing weapons
that are a threat to regional peace and American vital interests in certain
regions.
^For additional discussion of the "War of the Cities", see Thomas L. McNaugher,
"Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War,"
International Security 15 (Fall 1990), 5-34; and Robert D. Shuey et al., "Missile
Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces," Congressional Research Service Report
(3 October 1988), 1-2.
1. Present Extent
Although used initially in World War II, ballistic missiles have
spread relatively slowly to states other than the major powers. In the 1960s
there were reports that Egypt had developed liquid-propellant rockets. The
spread gradually increased and by 1980 India had launched an earth satellite.
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By that time, it appeared that several developing countries had acquired the
technologies needed to build modern guided rockets.* The disclosure of the
purchase by Saudi Arabia of Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles in 1988,
and the "war of the cities" focused attention on the extent of proliferation to
the developing world.
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Already some twenty Third World countries either possess ballistic
missiles or are in the process of acquiring them. Table 1 contains a list of
developing countries, missiles, ranges and accuracy. 5 Former Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Webster has predicted that at least
2john Harvey et al., Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and its Control, Center
for International Security and Arms Control Stanford University (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1991), 13.
^The technologies used to develop and manufacture ballistic missiles for delivering
warheads, and space-launch vehicles for launching satellites and lifting astronauts into
orbit, are often one and the same. The early Atlas ICBM also served as the booster that
carried John Glenn into orbit.
4A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) is defined as a ballistic missile with a
maximum range of 1,000 km or less, a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) is one with a
range between 1,000-3,000 km's, an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) has a range
of between 3,000-5,500 km's, and an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) has a range of
5,500 km or greater.
"'Table derived from multiple sources including Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
"Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Developing World," World Military Expenditures
and Arms Transfers 1988; The World's Missile Systems, (August 1988); "The Missile
Tables," Strategic Policy 19 (March 1991); and Missile Non-Proliferation: Implications for
the United States Navy, Prepared by Science Applications International Corporation for
the Defense Nuclear Agency (22 January 1990).
fifteen developing countries will be producing their own ballistic missiles by
the year 2000 and that three countries will have missiles with ranges of up to
2,500 miles. ° In order to develop an idea of the trends in ballistic missile
proliferation, an understanding is needed of the motives behind the pursuit
of ballistic missiles and their possible utility.
"Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Nuclear and Missile
Proliferation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.; 12-14,26-27. Testimony of William Webster, Director,
Central Intelligence Agency. The three countries expected to have missiles with ranges of
up to 2,500 miles are Israel, India rind Brazil.
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Afghanistan ScudB 500 300 900 Deployed
Algeria Frog-7 450 70 400 Deployed
Argentina Condor I 400 100 ? R&D
Condor U 450 900 900 R&D
Brazil MB/EE-150 500 150 7 R&D
MB/EE-350 500 350 7 R&D
MB/EE-600 7 600 7 R&D
MB/EE-1000 ? 1,000 7 R&D
SS-300 1,000 300 7 R&D
SS-1000 7 1,200 7 R&D
Egypt Frog-7 450 70 400 Deployed
SakrBO 200 80 7 Deployed
ScudB 500 300 900 Deployed
Improved Scud 1,000 300 900 R&D
Badr-2000 450 1.000 750 R&D
India Pnthvi 1,000 250 250 Tested 1988
Agni 900 2,500 7 Tested 1989
Iran Frog-7 450 70 400 Deployed
Iran-130 7 130 7 Deployed
ScudB 500 300 900 Deployed
Al-Husayn 135 625 500 Deployed
Iraq ScudB 500 300 900 Deployed
Al-Husayn 135 625 500 Deployed
Al-Abbas 500 900 300 Deployed
Israel Lance 275 130 365 Deployed
Jericho I 226 625 7 Deployed
Jericho U 226 1,500 ? Deployed
Libya SS-21 450 120 300 Deployed
ScudB 500 300 900 Deployed
Otrag 7 500 7 R&D
North Korea ScudB 500 300 900 Deployed
Scud B PIP ? 600 7 Adv. R&D
North Yemen SS-21 450 120 300 Deployed
Pakistan Hatfl 500 80 7 Tested 1989
HatfC 500 300 7 Tested 1989
Saudi Arabia CSS-2 2,000 3,000 2,500 Deployed
South Africa unknown 7 1,500 7 Tested 1989
South Korea Honest John 1,600 40 7 Deployed
Korean SSM 7 260 7 Deployed
South Yemen SS-21 450 120 300 Deployed
ScudB 500 300 900 Deployed
Taiwan Sky Horse 7 1,000 7 R&D
UAE ScudB 500 300 900 Deployed
Vietnam ScudB 500 300 900 Deployed
2. Motives
The main question with ballistic missile proliferation is why does a
nation develop and acquire missiles when there are other options to deliver
payloads? The reasons for such acquisitions appear to fall into three major
categories. That is to say, countries acquire or develop ballistic missile
systems for military-strategic, political-diplomatic, and economic reasons.
All, some, or even one of these reasons can be the rational behind the effort
to procure ballistic missile systems.
Under the military-strategic reasoning there are a couple of different
variations. The first and most common reason is to increase the offensive
capability of a nation. Ballistic missiles provide another means of delivering
payload on targets besides aircraft. This will give a nation a spread in their
strike capabilities and not have their "eggs all in one basket" in order to have
some diversity in delivery capability to hedge against an emerging
vulnerability to one or another system. Studies have shown that for normal
attrition rates (around 20 percent or less), aircraft are much more effective,
militarily and economically, at delivering warheads on target than ballistic
missiles. ' However, there are other factors to consider. For example, if ones
opponent has an extensive and highly capable air defense network, which are
becoming more prominent in the developing world, then missiles might be a
good choice for a strike package so that aircraft are not wasted. The main
advantage that ballistic missiles present over delivery via manned aircraft are
speed and certainty. Missiles travel several times faster than aircraft, are not
^See Steve Fetter. "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction," International
Security 16 (Summer 1991), 9-11; and Harvey, 25-62.
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subject to human fears and errors, and avoid interdiction by most defenses.
The proven exception is ballistic missile defense systems such as the Patriot,
successfully employed during the Gulf War against Iraqi Scud missiles.
The second major military-strategic reason to pursue ballistic missiles
is for deterrence. A strong case can be made that the majority of the Middle
Eastern countries have acquired ballistic missiles to deter Israel from a
preemptive or first strike against them, as Israel did in destroying Iraq's
nuclear reactor in 1983, and to counteract their nuclear capability. The same
can be said of Pakistani developments and acquisitions of both ballistic
missiles and nuclear weapons with respect to their neighbor India.
Political-diplomatic reasons are other motives behind the acquisition
or development of ballistic missiles. First among these is the political and
psychological impact that ballistic missiles have. States desire missiles
because of their perceived role as psychological weapons of terror that
invokes more fear than from aerial bombing. Even when armed with
conventional explosives, missile attacks may induce civilian panic out of
proportion to the damage or casualties they actually inflict. A case in point is
the record of Germany's V-2 strikes on London in 1944. Winston Churchill
wrote that Germany's missile war:
...imposed upon the people of London a burden perhaps even heavier than the air raids
of 1940 and 1941. Suspense and strain were more prolonged. Dawn brought no relief and
cloud no comfort. The man going home in the evening never new what he would find.... The
blind impersonal nature of the missile made the individual on the ground feel helpless.
There was little that he could do, no human enemy that he could see shot down.°
°McNaugher, 12. citing Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, vol. 6 of The
Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), 39.
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Iraq used its ballistic missile forces to such effect in the latter stages of the war
with Iran, after the civilian population had grown tired of the fighting, and
was believed to be instrumental in bringing about the cease fire. In Tel Aviv
and Riyadh during the Gulf war, missile attacks had a psychological and
political impact that was very apparent and, arguable more important than
the actual physical damage. Who can forget the images of Charles Jaco,
television commentator for Cable News Network (CNN), hurriedly putting
on his gas mask and frantically running for the bomb shelter when the
missile attack sirens went off in Riyadh?
Second among political-diplomatic reasons is that ballistic missiles
are symbols of national prestige and technological achievement. In many
developing countries the ballistic missile is the symbol of prestige that the
battleship, and in recent times, the aircraft carrier holds for major powers.
This can be characterized as the "bigger stick syndrome", where the kid on the
block with the biggest stick, or in this case the most technologically advanced
missiles, wields the most power in the neighborhood. The capability for
indigenous manufacture of ballistic missiles calls attention to a state's
technical prowess and military self-sufficiency, and suggests a degree of
independence from foreign military suppliers and political influence. This
further heightens stature. India is an example of a country that prides itself
on its technological achievements. They have used their space launch
missile program for military defensive purposes and have produced two
ballistic missile systems, the Agni and the Prithvi. In addition, some press
reports have suggested that India is working on a missile with an estimated
12
range of 3,000 miles.9 Janne Nolan puts it succinctly when she states: "India
seems to have used its civilian space program to evade international
restrictions on the supply of military manufacturing technology and to
achieve the international status accorded states with advanced satellite (and
missile) capabilities. Demonstrations of its technological prowess, both
civilian and military, are part of its broader strategy to challenge the enduring
stratification of the international system that it believes has deprived it of its
rightful status as a regional superpower."10
By acquiring missiles a regime can demonstrate to its citizens a
commitment to a strong defense. During wartime, firing missiles against
ones enemy may increase domestic morale, regardless of the actual military
results of the attack. In the Iran-Iraq War, at one time or another, each side
tried to strengthen public resolve by announcing its missile strikes against the
adversary's cities.H
The final major category under which states pursue ballistic missile
technology is for economic reasons. Many states, including China, North
Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, Israel, and South Africa, have pursued, or are
pursuing, indigenous missile production capability in order to generate
missile export sales. 12 Demand for ballistic missiles is currently high, and
"janne E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991 ), 44.
l°Ibid., 60.
11 Harvey, 81.
l^For an additional discussion of Chinese arms sales, see Eden Y. Woon, "Chinese Arms
Sales and U.S.-China Military Relations," Asian Survey 24 Qune 1989). For an additional
discussion of other economic imperatives see Harvey, 81; Nolan, 16-20; and Kathleen C.
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their sale can be an excellent source of hard currency flowing into an
economically depressed country. In addition, production of missiles, and
other sophisticated weapons systems, is a means to promote economic
development by enriching and strengthening the national R&D and
industrial base. It creates research and manufacturing infrastructures,
including facilities for designing, testing, and producing high technology
military systems. Such activities strengthen the overall economic base of a
nation.
3. Utility
Ballistic missiles possess certain characteristics that have traditionally
accorded them special status as military instruments, including their speed
and range in striking targets, their ability to penetrate defenses, and their
ability to deliver warheads of increasing destructiveness and lethality
(particularly nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads).
The high speed of ballistic missiles enables an attacker to strike with
little warning and makes it very difficult for the defender to destroy incoming
missiles. Because ballistic missiles are unguided for most of their flight, they
generally cannot be defeated or diverted with electronic countermeasures.
Unlike bomber aircraft, missiles do not place crew members at risk of being
killed or captured. The speeds at which ballistic missiles travel imparts
considerable energy to the target when they land. The Scud-B travels at three
times the speed of sound when it lands, not only exploding unexpended fuel
Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many: The Arms Control Challenge of the 90s
(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 106-121.
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but causing considerable damage with the impact of its two-ton missile
fuselage. 13
More powerful rocket motors can also extend a missile's range.
Achieving the ability to launch ballistic missiles to intercontinental range was
a critical threshold in the Cold War. It made it possible to target the other side
with weapons deployed from within one's own territory. Developing
countries also need missiles of sufficient range to target adversaries and to be
able to deploy and launch them from secure sites within their own territory.
In most regions the importance of range depends more on geography,
including the distance between adversaries, the size of the territory being
defended or attacked, and the proximity of population centers and key
military targets to an adversary's forces.14
In the developing world, where many antagonists share a common
border, the traditional U.S.-Soviet definitions for short-, intermediate-, and
long-range missiles have limited usefulness. In many regions even missile
systems classified as short-range (less than 1,000 kilometers) could reach deep
into the territory of an adversary. Most third world missiles are also mobile
and can be moved closer to an adversary's border and thus increase their
effective range. Several countries listed in Table 1 have missiles that can
travel several hundred kilometers, and some are developing missiles that
will be able to travel over one-thousand kilometers. Countries aiming to




For example, both Israel and India already have missiles that can reach targets
within the southern territory of the former Soviet Union. 15
Increasing the range of systems, however, does not automatically
accord greater military capability. There is currently a tradeoff between a
given missile's range and its weight. Iraq reduced the weight of the warhead
on its Scud-B missiles as one measure to extend their range. China reduced
the range of the missile it sold to Saudi Arabia when it replaced the nuclear
warheads with much heavier conventional warheads. 1° Longer missile
ranges also place a higher demand on the missiles accuracy.
A missiles accuracy is achieved primarily by its guidance and control
systems which are its most sophisticated systems. The farther a ballistic
missile travels, the farther off course it will wander for a given degree of
inaccuracy in its guidance and control systems. Compared to the current
generation of missiles produced in the industrial world, some of which have
terminal guidance that gives them an accuracy of a few feet, most models in
the third world are relatively inaccurate. Current ballistic missiles in the
third world have a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of approximately 300 meters
or greater.!?
The possession of even inaccurate missiles provides the ability to
conduct strategic bombardment with the objective of surprise attack,
retaliation, or demoralization of an enemy population. To be effective in
15 Ibid., 65.
i^Shuey et al., 9.
*' See David Rubenson and Anna Slomovic, "The Impact of Missile Proliferation on
U.S. Power Projection Capabilities/' A RAND Note (June 1990), 13; Harvey et al., 26-30;
and Nolan, 70-71. Define CEP!
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executing a surprise attack that gains a significant military advantage, missiles
must pose a danger to the opponent's forces. However, to achieve militarily
significant objectives, they must have a warhead and accuracy suitable to the
target. To compensate for inaccuracy, a missile can be fired at a large area
target, such as a city or military installation, where even an inaccurate missile
is likely to hit some portion of the target. Alternatively, inaccuracy can be
offset by using a warhead that will destroy or contaminate a large area. A
surprise attack against an undefended civilian population is a powerful signal
in a crisis, but also an escalation that invites retaliation and possible the
intervention of other parties.
Inaccurate missiles seem better suited to a role of retaliation through
strikes against population centers. In this way, a disadvantage on the
battlefield might be compensated for by escalating hostilities to a level that is
unacceptable to the enemy. The resolve of a government can be effectively
communicated by a retaliatory strike against a city or economic center.
Ballistic missiles have a potential to provide retaliatory deterrence, as the
superpowers used them during the Cold War, however, they must possess
significantly destructive warheads in order to be perceived as a real threat.
They must also have the ability to survive an enemy attack and then
penetrate enemy defenses to fulfill the requirements of deterrence. *°
The use of missiles to demoralize the enemy population is also a
possibility. As discussed earlier, missiles used as a weapon of terror for its
psychological impact can be quite useful. The German government in 1944,
1 "William K. Domke, Missile* and the Proliferation of Mass Destruction, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore, CA: University of California, March 1989),
13.
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which was losing the war on the battlefield, launched rockets at London to
demoralize the British population and undermine the government's resolve.
The Iraqi government in 1988, while it was winning on the battlefield,
launched missiles at Iran to demoralize the Iranian population. Ballistic
missiles generate fear in civilian populations and military forces because they
strike without much warning, can cause great damage, and absent a dedicated
missile defense system, cannot be defended against.
Since the present generation of third world ballistic missiles are
relatively inaccurate against anything but large area targets, the ability to
deliver destructive warheads is one of the key attributes that makes ballistic
missiles militarily significant. As countries acquire more powerful rocket
motors, they can deliver larger, more destructive warheads. Many countries
have the Scud-B ballistic missile which can carry warheads of up to 500
kilograms. Several of the countries listed in Table 1 have or are developing
missiles that carry 1,000-kilogram or greater warheads and the modified CSS-2
missiles Saudi Arabia bought from China are capable of delivering a 2,000-
kilogram high-explosive warhead. Most of these missiles were designed for
conventional warhead delivery, however, the inefficiency of conventionally
armed missiles seems to be well understood by the new missile states, since
most of them are actively seeking nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons. 1^
l^See John S. McCain, III, "Proliferation in the 1990s: Implications for U.S. Policy and
Force Planning," Strategic Reviezv 17 (Summer 1989), 11-16; Earl I. Ficken, Jr., Tactical
Missile Defense: A Chink in the Annor? (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 19 June
1992), 8; and Fetter, 6.
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Many of the missiles listed are powerful enough to deliver a small
nuclear warhead (less than 500 kilograms). A few could even carry a larger
nuclear warhead that could be produced by a newer nuclear state. Nearly all
the missiles could also be adapted without a great deal of difficulty to deliver
chemical or biological warheads. Chemical warheads are becoming easier to
acquire and can kill as many people as dozens or even hundreds of
conventionally armed missiles if employed in favorable conditions.20 Even
worse, biological warheads that disperse anthrax spores offer the possibility of
inflicting casualties on the scale of small nuclear weapons.21 With chemical,
biological, or nuclear warheads the terror becomes very real and the accuracy
is not as important.
In this section it has been shown that ballistic missile proliferation is
a real and growing threat. There are a variety of reasons for acquiring ballistic
missiles and even though their utility presently appears to be limited, many
countries are trying to overcome those limitations. One question that should
be addressed is what methodology is there in place to deal with this growing
threat?
B. MEANS OF CONTROL
There are three major means presently in place or being developed to
deal with the growing ballistic missile problem throughout the developing
world. These means include arms control, export controls and defenses. The




utilizing weapons of mass destruction is the 1972 Biological Weapons (BW)
Convention. This affects the problem indirectly by limiting the type of
warhead that can be employed on a ballistic missile. The 1972 BW
Convention prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or
acquisition by other means, or retention of biological agents or toxins, as well
as weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.22 it should be noted that the
prohibitions apply only to types and to quantities of biological agents and
toxins that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes. 23 a loophole is that "protective purposes" can be used to
investigate into the properties of biological and toxin agents in the name of
defense. An additional problem with the BW Convention is that there is no
real verification provision.
The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and biological
weapons in war, but not the production or stockpiling of such weapons.
Efforts to ban chemical weapons have been continuing since that time.
Presently, negotiations on a Chemical Weapons (CW) Convention are
continuing in the multilateral Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.24
This may develop an international norm with respect to chemical weapons,
but some Arab states such as Syria, Egypt, and Iraq appear to use chemical
22Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control Agreements (Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International
Peace Research, 1982), 47-50.
•"The term "prophylactic" encompasses medical activities such as diagnosis, therapy,
and immunization; while the term "protective" covers development of protective masks
and clothing, air and water filtration systems, deflection and warning devices, and
decontamination equipment. Goldblat, 47-48.
24 Fetter, 32.
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weapons as the main instrument to offset the Israeli nuclear arsenal. The use
of chemical weapons in war by Iraq and the fact that the CW Convention is
multilateral will both tend to make it harder to come to a consensus.
Another way presently in place to control ballistic missile proliferation is
through export controls. The Australia Group, a loosely knit group of 23
countries including the United States, has for some time limited the export to
certain countries of selected equipment and chemicals that can be used in
production of chemical agents. The group has identified nine chemicals on
its "core list" and forty-one chemicals on its "warning list". These lists are
circulate to industry in an effort to control sales.25 Yet, chemical weapons
have spread, with key technologies often slipping through the export controls
of U.S. allies.
The basis of U.S. efforts to control proliferation of ballistic missiles is the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). On April 16, 1987, the
establishment of the MTCR was announced by the seven major Western
industrial countries: the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan,
and Germany.26 The MTCR consists of a basic policy statement, a set of
guidelines to limit the conditions under which missile technology may be
transferred, an annex listing technologies to be controlled, and an informal
mechanism by which the partners can share information about potential
transfers. The MTCR has undoubtedly succeeded in identifying the threat
^^McNaugher, 25.
^"Congress, House, Foreign Affairs Committee, Missile Proliferation: The Need for
Controls (Missile Technology Control Regime), 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 12 July 1989.
Statement of Dante B. Fascell, Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee on the
Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and on International
Economic Policy and Trade.
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and creating an awareness of the missile proliferation problem among
Western suppliers. U.S. officials have also claimed that the MTCR has been
effective in stopping at least one ballistic missile program and has inhibited
the development of programs by other states making it more difficult and
expensive for countries to obtain relevant systems and technologies. 2 7
However, it has probably only slowed an exponential proliferation. There
have been reports that the MTCR has been circumvented by French and
German companies and some evidence exists that India enhanced its
indigenous capability to develop certain missile system components and
technologies as a result of MTCR constraints.28 As one Representative put it:
"while we're trying to turn off the ballistic missile technology tap through the
establishment of MTCR, it would appear that the spigot can't be closed all the
way."29
The final tool to combat the threat of ballistic missiles is through active
ballistic missile defenses. Due to the fact that third world countries are
developing and acquiring ballistic missiles for a variety of reasons and that
arms controls and export controls to date need more "teeth" in them,
defenses will play a major role in countering the threat of ballistic missiles. It
is for this reason, this thesis addresses the role that missile defenses can play
^'Harvey et al., 16.
zovVhen further purchase from the United States of key material for solid-propellant
rocket fuel became impossible, the Indian space program developed other materials.
Western embargoes on high technology were beaten in the fabrication and operation of a
high-precision tracking radar, a key part of missile testing. See "Development of Polar
Satellite Launch Vehicle Told," The Hindu (Madras), reprinted in FBIS September 27,
1989.
^Statement of Rep. Dante B. Fascell,4.
22
in the future national security and how the Navy can be a part of that defense
effort. If defenses are to be a part of national security in the future, then one
must also look at the future threat from ballistic missiles.
C FUTURE THREAT
Although the Third World ballistic missile threat to the United States, its
forward deployed forces, and vital interests is currently mitigated by low
warhead accuracy, payload type, and the size of threat nation arsenals
(although they presently are politically and psychologically destabilizing and
threaten large area targets), several trends generate concern. First, as nations
continue to supplement their strike aircraft force with ballistic missiles to
ensure the penetration of enemy air defense networks, there has been a
corresponding emphasis on the development of nuclear, chemical, biological,
and advanced conventional warheads. Secondly, the range, payload, and
overall technical sophistication of ballistic missiles in the developing world is
continually improving. Additionally, the introduction of terminal guidance
on ballistic missiles would provide a dramatic step jump in accuracy to these
weapons. Whereas improvements in payload, accuracy, and technical
sophistication tend to increase the tactical utility and lethality of a weapon
system, extending the range of a missile places more targets at risk and
increases safe standoff distances for opposing forces.30
The value of ballistic missile arsenals in the developing world will be
enhanced in the future, and therefore be an even more significant threat, by
30Rjchard A. Holzknecht, Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World: The
Impact on U.S. Naval Operations (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
September 1990), 24.
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weaponizing missiles with more lethal warheads, improving warhead range
and accuracy, and increasing the number of indigenously produced missiles
and launchers. These enhancements also seem to be well understood by the
new missile states, since most of them are engaged in ongoing efforts in each
of these areas.
1. Warhead Issues
As discussed earlier, one of the key military attributes of ballistic
missiles is their ability to deliver destructive warheads, even the relatively
inaccurate missiles currently deployed can be effective against unprotected
large targets and can be even more effective against such targets if they can
deliver warheads that destroy or contaminate large areas. Nuclear, chemical,
and biological warheads can be especially effective against such targets. Some
modern conventional, or high-explosive, warheads are also effective over
relatively large, soft areas and can be even more dangerous when delivered by
accurate missiles.
The most common conventional warheads contain large amounts of
high explosives (HE) that cause blast waves when detonated, showering an
area with shrapnel and debris. The blast from the detonation of 500
kilograms of HE would generally destroy buildings within a radius of 110-140
feet, would cause serious damage to buildings of standard construction within
a radius of 150-180 feet, and would cause deaths and injuries out to 300-350
feet.31 Larger warheads like those associated with the CSS-2 missile that
China sold to Saudi Arabia can carry as much as 2,000 kilograms of high
explosive. Detonating a warhead of this size would seriously damage
31 Shuey et al., 23.
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buildings out to 350 feet and kill or injure personnel out to more than 650
feet.32 It is intuitively obvious from this that the larger the warhead, the
greater the lethality radius. The lethality of a ballistic missile system can be
increased by many orders of magnitude if nuclear, biological, chemical or
advanced conventional warheads are employed. For this reason, many
nations with a ballistic missile arsenal are attempting to pursue, and will
continue to pursue, one or more of these payloads. Table 2 depicts the current
state of proliferation in the developing world.33
32ibid., 24.
^Estimates are based on a variety of sources, See Fetter, 14; McCain, 11; and includes
unclassified testimony by ex-CIA Director William Webster, Seth Cams, David Goldberg,
Elisha D. Harris and others, and do not reflect the estimates of the U.S. Government.
Suspected-includes suspected and suspected but doubtful; Possible-includes possibility to
develop or possible weapons stocks; Likely-likely to have weapons stocks either developed
indigenously or supplied from other nations; Research-includes low level research; R & D-
includes a dedicated research and development program and /or procurement.
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Argentina Possible R&D R&D






India Likely Research Yes
Indonesia Possible
Iran Yes R&D R&D
Iraq Yes Likely R&D
Israel Yes Research Yes
Korea, North Yes Likely R&D
Korea, South Likely Research Research
Libya Yes Research Research




South Africa Likely Research Likely
Syria Yes Likely Research




In several developing countries, the development of nuclear
weapons is closely linked to the development of ballistic missiles. The
continuing spread of ballistic missiles would be most dangerous if some non-
nuclear weapons states become able to produce nuclear explosives suitable for
the warheads of their missiles. Missiles provide the surest means of
delivering nuclear weapons deep into hostile territory and increase the
credibility of a nuclear deterrent force and effectiveness of a nuclear strike
force. Nuclear weapons greatly enhance the utility of inaccurate missiles and
help justify the costs of their purchase or development. The combination of
missiles and nuclear warheads provides a substantial means of inflicting great
damage almost anywhere within the missile's range, and provides a powerful
psychological device for international relations.34
Of the countries listed in Table 1, eight either currently possess
nuclear warheads or have the capability to develop them within the next few
years.35 Israel is believed by many to have nuclear weapons and nuclear
warheads for its missiles.36 India, with its substantial nuclear industrial base
and the experience of its 1974 nuclear explosive test, clearly could produce
nuclear warheads if it were so inclined, and may already have done so.3?
South Africa has been able to build nuclear weapons since 1980 and may have
an undeclared nuclear arsenal of a few weapons and is further rumored to be
^Robert Shuey, Missile proliferation: A Discussion of U.S. Objectives and Policy
Options, CRS Report for Congress (21 February 1990), 9.
^Third World SRBM Systems and Programs, U.S. Army Missile & Space Intelligence
Center, U.S. Army Intelligence Agency (May 1989), preface.
36shuey et al., 24.
37Ibid., 25.
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involved in nuclear testing.38 The above are just a few examples of the
development of nuclear warheads in the Third World. From Table 2 we see
that there are currently four Third World nations with known or suspected
nuclear capability and 14 involved in various levels of nuclear research.
The spread of long-range, inaccurate missiles among countries that
do not have nuclear weapons has led several of them to acquire chemical
weapons to increase the effectiveness and significance of their missile forces.
As depicted in Tables 1 and 2, most countries with a ballistic missile arsenal
are also engaged in some level of chemical weapons research. Substituting
chemical agents for high explosives can significantly increase the lethality of a
warhead. Due to their potential lethality, chemical weapons have long been
considered a "poor man's Atom bomb".
Any country with a chemical industry can produce chemical weapons
agents.39 Four general types of agents are available for use as weapons
causing serious injury or death through inhalation and/or body surface
contact. These four are: (1) blister agents, general tissue irritants such as
mustard gas that can burn or blister the skin or lung tissue if inhaled; (2)
blood gases, agents such as hydrogen cyanide that interferes with cell
respiration after entering the blood circulation through the lungs; (3) lung
irritants, choking agents such as phosgene that irritate and damage lung
tissue; and (4) nerve agents, chemicals such as tabun, sarin, and soman that
^Holzknecht, 29; Shuey et al., 30.
^"Chemical warheads are munitions containing liquid or gaseous chemical agents that
cause toxic damage to living tissues rather than damage through physical impact from
blast, through shrapnel or heat. Chemical agents do little damage to buildings or vehicles,
though persistent agents can be used to deny use of structures and areas.
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interferes with the transmission of nerve impulses and disrupt vital bodily
functions such as breathing.40 The technology and expertise needed to
produce chemical agents are very similar to those common to the
petrochemical, pharmaceutical, fertilizer, and insecticide industries. Any
country with a modest amount of technical expertise that produces and
refines petroleum could make mustard gas without having to import any
chemicals.
Chemical weapons proliferation and the use of chemical agents in
missile warheads is likely to figure significantly in the future for several
reasons. First, Iraq demonstrated that chemical agents do have military uses
by employing them in the Iran-Iraq War. The war provided the Third World
with a case study of how to organize chemical forces, in the kind of chemical
agents required, in the need to solve targeting and weather-prediction
problems, and in the ways in which conventional weapons systems could be
adapted do deliver chemical agents.41 Iraq demonstrated that chemical
weapons could be used against static military targets, against the rear area of
attacking forces, and against forces near the front lines. Second, the
international community had a relatively muted reaction to Iraq's use of
chemical weapons. Finally, the perceived need of other states to consider the
development of a chemical weapon capability to protect themselves.4
2
40Shuey et al., 31.
4lSee McNaugher, 17-24; McCain, 13.
4-^Edwin W. Besch, "How the Technology Explosion is Changing World Power
Relationships," Strategic Policy, 19 (March 1991), 10.
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Chemical proliferation is likely to propel countries into development of
biological weapons as well.43
The threat of biological warheads is also likely to increase in the
future. Biological weapons contain living organisms that can cause disease or
death.44 For weapons purposes, disease agents can be produced in quantity by
various fermentation processes. The lethal potential of these weapons has
been increased recently by advances made in genetic engineering and
biotechnology. For example, normally harmless, non-disease producing
microorganisms can now be modified to become highly toxic or to produce
diseases for which an opponent has no known treatment or vaccine.45
Biological weapons can be divided into two distinct categories: toxins
(toxic chemicals produced by living organisms) and pathogens (living
organisms that produce disease). One of the most studied toxins is botulinal
toxin, which has a 50 per cent lethality to human beings at an estimated dose
of 50 millionths of a gram.46 However, botulinal toxin is not suitable to air
delivery because it decays rapidly upon exposure to air.47 Pathogens, on the
other hand, may have significant advantages over toxins as far as air delivery
is concerned. In particular, bacillus anthracis, the bacteria that causes anthrax,
4^For a more complete collection of essays and testimony on chemical and biological
weapons, See Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Global Spread of
Chemical and Biological Weapons, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 1990.
"Toxins produced by bacteria and other living organisms block bodily functions or





seems especially well suited for dissemination by missiles or bombs because of
its ability to form spores that can survive violent dissemination methods and
exposure to sun, air, and rain.48 Anthrax is nearly 100 per cent fatal when a
human being is exposed to as few as 8,000 spores.49
Presently, this data must be kept in perspective. Biological agents
have never been tested in combat. Although it is readily conceivable that a
country could develop a biological weapons capability, and according to Table
2 approximately 13 developing nations are involved with some level or
research and/or development, the degree of expertise and care required in
processing and handling the agent to prevent contamination, and the
difficulty of developing and producing a warhead to disseminate the agent
effectively would generally be greater than for chemical weapons. Since
countries are pursuing a biological weapons program, they should be
considered when discussing warhead issues on future ballistic missiles.
To improve lethality and circumvent the problem of low warhead
accuracy, developing countries may attempt to weaponize their ballistic
missiles with advanced conventional warheads. In order for a weapon to
have a reasonable probability of damaging the intended target, the kill radius
of the warhead should be larger than its CEP. For this reason, area attack
munitions like cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives (FAE) have sparked
considerable interest. FAE weapons disperse a mist of liquid fuel over the
target area and then ignite the droplets to initiate an earth-shattering blast.




above-ground concrete structures such as hardened aircraft shelters and
munitions bunkers.50
As in the case of chemical weapons, there appears to be a correlation
between the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the spread of cluster bomb
technology. Even though cluster bomb technology pre-dated the spread of
ballistic missiles, there has been a renewed interest in the Third World in
cluster bomb technology and its possible application to ballistic missiles.
Cluster bombs are particularly effective against soft targets like parked aircraft,
radars, and personnel, and can also be used to crater roads and runways.
Ballistic missiles armed with cluster bombs or submunitions represent a
greater threat than unitary HE warheads because of their greater and more
uniform coverage. An even greater threat with significant possibilities in the
future is a submunitions warhead for a ballistic missile with the
submunitions filled with chemical or biological agents.
2. Accuracy Issues
As listed in Table 1, most of the current ballistic missiles have a CEP
of 300 meters or more. Armed with a unitary HE warhead, these weapons
have a soft-target kill radius of 200 meters or less, depending on warhead size.
This means that a conventionally armed missile has little chance of inflicting
damage on the intended aim point, especially if the target is a small area or
point target.
The accuracy of a ballistic missile system is affected by both endo- and
exo-atmospheric effects. Because of this we must make the distinction
50i<eith B. Payne and Marc J. Berkowitz, "Anti-tactical Missile Defense, Allied
Security, and the INF Treaty," Strategic Revieiv (Summer 1988), 28.
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between guidance accuracy and re-entry (RV) accuracy. Guidance accuracy can
be improved by commanding exo-atmospheric corrections and adjusting
booster burn time. RV accuracy is affected by endo-atmospheric effects such as
wind, atmospheric density, nose-cone erosion, and RV asymmetry. To
improve the accuracy of the RV, one must minimize drag. This will increase
penetration speed and therefore reduce the time that the RV is exposed to
lower atmospheric effects. Advanced nose-cone technology is one of the
critical items that Third World missile states will continue to pursue.
There are a number of other technologies and methods that
developing missile states will pursue in order to improve the accuracy of
their systems. One method is to use terrain matching sensors which require
detailed terrain maps and pertain mainly to fixed targets. Inertial guidance is
another method to overcome inaccuracy. As mentioned in the previous
section, another means of coping with the demand for high accuracy is to use
dispersed submunitions patterns to extend the lethal radius of the weapon.
Other future solutions may include using "smart" submunitions to seek out
the target or terminal guidance like homing anti-radiation seekers on
warheads. A final possibility includes the combination of terrain matching
sensors or inertial guidance with terminal guidance to strike at mobile targets
and significantly increase the accuracy of future missiles.51 The improved
accuracy that terminal guidance brings would mean that ships could be
threatened and hit by ballistic missiles. This would mean that the Navy
^1 For additional discussion of future accuracy improvement possibilities, See David
Rubenson and James Borono, "NATO's Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile Requirements and
Their Relationship to the Strategic Defense Initiative," RAND Corporation Series, A
Project AIR FORCE report prepared for the United States Air Force (December 1987), 8-11;
and Holzknecht, 48-53.
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would have to patrol at a greater stand-off distance from shore to remain out
of reach of ballistic missiles or develop an active defense system and
countermeasures to protect themselves.
3. Range Issues
Another trend that will continue in the future is the development of
longer range missile systems. As indicated in Table 1, most current missiles
fall within a 300 to 1000 kilometer range. Israel, India, and Iraq are attempting
to produce missiles with much longer range. Those nations unable to
indigenously produce longer range missiles have been resourceful in
extending the range of systems purchased. The range of these systems has
been improved by reducing warhead weight (as in the case of Iraq's Al-
Husayn missile), lengthening the missile and enabling it to carry more fuel
(as in the case of the Al-Abbas), and reducing the missile weight through the
use of light-weight alloys and composites (as in the case of Scuds being
produced by Iran and North Korea)52
Several Third World nations have extended the range of their
ballistic missile systems by applying technology derived from national space
programs. If a nation is able to place a satellite in orbit, it is potentially capable
of delivering ballistic missiles of up to intercontinental range. India has used
its space program to develop a ballistic missile that is capable of striking
targets outside of its region into the Middle East, Central Asia, or China.53 It
52Holzknecht, 53.
"For an additional discussion of India's adaptation of space-launch vehicles to its
ballistic missile program, See Nohin, 40-48.
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is only a matter of time before more developing systems achieve intermediate
and intercontinental range.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The proliferation of military technology, especially ballistic missile
technology, is receiving more and more attention. In the new international
system, ballistic missile proliferation and related weapons of mass destruction
are one of the major threats to stability in the new security environment.
Today, some twenty nations either possess or are in the process of acquiring
ballistic missiles. These nations have pursued ballistic missiles for a number
of reasons that fall under the categories of military-strategic, political-
diplomatic, and economic reasons. The actual military utility of these
systems is relatively low at the present time because the missiles are generally
conventionally armed warheads of relatively low yield that is combined with
being relatively inaccurate. However, it has been shown that they can be
quite useful for political reasons and psychological terror and can be effective
against large area targets like airfields and bases. In the future this minimized
threat is likely to grow due to the development and application of technology
that exists today. That application will greatly increase their utility and put
many more targets, including naval vessels, at risk.
The Secretary of Defense has recently stated that by the year 2000, some of
the nations that have or are pursuing ballistic missiles may be able to arm
those weapons with chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons and that the
requisite technology is available to allow those nations to increase the range,
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accuracy, and lethality of their ballistic missile systems.54 As missile ranges
increase due to technology, and missile accuracy increases due to improved
guidance, and warhead lethality increases, the civilian populations of U.S.
allies (and in 10 to 15 years, possibly the United States itself) will become
increasingly vulnerable to these weapons. Also, forward deployed U.S.
military facilities and forces, on both land and sea, could be threatened by
these weapons. The greatest risk in the near future may be the delivery of
chemical weapons, either by unitary warhead or submunitions. Chemical
weapons was a key concern of the U.S. military as it moved to deal with Iraq's
aggression in Kuwait. As the then Secretary of State George Shultz said in
San Francisco in 1988: "The worst nightmare of all would be the eventual
combination of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons in the hands of
governments with terrorist histories. ...These weapons increase the potential
for devastation in unstable regions of the Third World. And the conflicts
themselves may be far more difficult to contain or isolate. "55
54statement of Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney before the Senate Armed
Services Committee on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 28 July 1992, 8.
55"Two Weapons Troubling to Shultz," Washington Post, 30 October 1988, A35.
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III. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES (TMD) IN NATIONAL SECURITY
A. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
A new national security strategy was unveiled by President Bush on
August 2, 1990. A litmus test of that strategy was the Gulf War which soon
followed. During the war, Iraqi ballistic missiles and possible chemical
warheads were of grave concern to the United States and coalition forces. In
the not too distant future, United States forces, its allies, and its vital interests
may be threatened by Third World missiles. Because of this threat, the focus
of this section is the role that theater ballistic missile defenses can play in the
new national security strategy.
That focus is important because the United States is facing a new strategic
environment. The Soviet Union has broken up into a Commonwealth of
Independent States and is no longer considered enemy number one. A new
danger is considered to be the spread of, and acquisition of, ballistic missiles
and weapons of mass destruction by many Third World countries. As
discussed in the previous chapter, the threat these weapons will pose to the
United States, its forces, its allies, and its vital interests are not insignificant.
The defense strategies in the recent bipolar world of Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD) and deterrence through the threat of retaliation and
punishment may no longer be viable in the new international system.
Theater missile defenses may be required to defeat such a threat and are just
one part of a national security strategy.
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The end of the Cold War has resulted in a change of focus in terms of
United States national security. The United States is now concerned less with
a global adversary capable of destroying our country and more with lesser
adversaries capable in the near term of threatening our regional national
interests and in the long term of threatening the United States itself. This
translates militarily into a regionally focused defense strategy. 1 The National
Military Strategy describes this shift.2 It calls for reduced armed forces capable
of meeting the military requirements of the new regional defense strategy.
These forces will be capable of supporting the four pillars of the strategy,
mainly: deterrence and strategic defense, crisis response, forward presence,
and reconstitution.3 The role that theater missile defenses can play in each of
those fundamental pillars will be examined in the following sections.
1. Deterrence
As stated in the National Military Strategy: "... maintenance of a
modern, fully capable, and reliable strategic deterrent remains the number
one defense priority of the United States. A credible deterrent requires a
reliable warning system, modern nuclear forces, the capability and flexibility
to support a spectrum of response options and a defensive system for global
protection against limited strikes."4 Theater ballistic missile defenses fit in
1-See President, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1991) and General Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy 1992 (Washington,
DC: GPC\ January 1992).




this foundation by adding to the flexibility of response options and as a
defensive system against ballistic missile strikes.
Missile defenses are explicitly stated as an integral part of the
National Security Strategy under deterrence.5 To understand the role that
they are explicitly envisioned to fill a little background is needed. For eight
years the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has explored advanced
technologies with the aim of determining the feasibility of effective, non-
nuclear ballistic missile defenses. The initial focus of SDI reflected U.S.
concerns about growing Soviet first-strike capabilities. Thus, an initial
deployment of defenses, or Phase I Strategic Defense System (SDS) was to
have provided the minimum defensive capability that would add
meaningfully to deterrence of a possible Soviet first-strike. The minimum
defensive capability would have 7,000 Brilliant Pebbles interceptors in space
and approximately 4,000 ground-based interceptors to destroy a percentage, on
the order of one-half, of a massive Soviet attack involving several thousand
Re-entry Vehicles (RV) launched against the United States.« By knocking out
a large number of warheads, less would get through to hit U.S. bases, silo's,
and bombers on the ground. Therefore the U.S. would have a strong
retaliatory force remaining and that possibility would add to deterrence
against the Soviet Union. That deterrence threat was one of severe
retaliation to almost punishment.
^National Security Strategy of the United States, 27.
"Dennis McDowell, "Changing Roles for Ballistic Missile Defenses: From Deterrence to
Protection," Strategic Review 19 (Summer 1991), 44-53; and John L. Piotrowski, "SDI and
Missile Proliferation/' Global Affairs 6 (Spring 1991), 62-76.
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However, since 1987 the world has changed dramatically, with
significant implications for U.S. strategy and missile defenses. The strategic
realities of Third World ballistic missiles and political and security
instabilities in the Commonwealth of Independent States have not been lost
on President Bush. The Gulf War and the role of the Patriot missile in
defending against Iraq's Scud missile attacks may have reinforced the
message. SDI was refocused after the Gulf War when President Bush stated in
his State of the Union Address of January 30, 1991: "I have directed that the
SDI program be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic
missile strikes, whatever their source. Let us pursue an SDI program that can
deal with any future threat to the United States, to our forces overseas, and to
our friends and allies. "^ This defense system is now known as Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). It is envisioned to be a defense
against accidental or unauthorized launches from the former Soviet Union
or deliberate launches by Third World states. The GPALS system would
eventually be less than half the size of a Phase I system involving about 1,000
Brilliant Pebbles and about 750 ground-based interceptors. The limited threat
it would be capable of defending against would be approximately 200 re-entry
vehicles maximum.
8
GPALS does not enhance deterrence as envisioned by SDI Phase I. By
being able to intercept only 200 re-entry vehicles, it would not ensure a larger
' "President Bush's State of the Union Address," New York Times, 1 February 1991.
"Bruce W. McDonald, "Strategic Nuclear Policy in a Time of Fundamental Change," in
Reconstituting National Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy, eds. James J.
Tritten and Paul N. Stockton, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 30 September
1991), 124.
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retaliatory force against a massive Russian nuclear attack. What GPALS does
do though is provide some protection against lesser strikes from most Third
World missile states or the remaining nuclear states of the former Soviet
Union. GPALS is the explicit missile defense system in the new strategy that
provides a global strategic protections system.
Another significant implication for U.S. strategy under deterrence is
the question of how to deter Third World nations. Deterring the use of
nuclear weapons against U.S. allies, forces or interests is a relatively easy
proposition because the United States has an overwhelming nuclear
superiority over all Third World nuclear nations. Any first-use of nuclear
weapons by a regional adversary would face nuclear retaliation and severe
punishment that could totally destroy them. The real question is how to
deter a regional adversaries use of chemical or biological weapons. That
prospect raises a number of questions. Would the U.S. respond with a
proportional response using chemical or biological weapons? That would
make it seem like the U.S. was playing the adversary's game of conflict
escalation. In a time where America expects casualties to be limited, that
response would definitely not limit casualties. Another question is would
the U.S. respond with nuclear weapons? That would have significant
international implications. The international community would probably
condemn us for using nuclear weapons first and at the same time that use
would send a signal to the world that it is okay to use nuclear weapons. A
final question is would the U.S. respond with strictly conventional forces.
The problem here is that threat may not carry enough weight to deter an
adversary from using chemical or biological weapons. Deterrence of Third
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World nations use of ballistic missiles is a very difficult problem facing the
United States. Theater ballistic missile defenses can help in providing certain
solutions.
The first role that theater ballistic missile defenses can fill in the
security foundation of deterrence is that they can ameliorate the need for
deterrence. With theater missile defenses, the United States would have the
capability to deny the enemy their objective of using ballistic missiles to attack
cities, bases, ports, and troops. An effective ballistic missile defense system
can defeat the ballistic missiles and provide protection for the task force. The
question of how the deter a regional adversary does not pose such a
significant problem with defenses that can defeat ballistic missile attacks.
Ideally, the United States would prefer to deter the use of ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction, but should it fail, defenses will ease the burden
of how to respond and the contingency operations can continue.
In conjunction with the first role, a related benefit of theater ballistic
missile defenses is the possibility of devaluing ballistic missiles. An
opponent may be less likely to use its ballistic missiles if it knows that the
United States has missile defense systems in theater to protect its forces and
interests. This may be especially true if any future systems have a high
enough probability of kill factor. By making missile attacks futile, the
perceived utility militarily, politically, and psychologically can be lessened
considerable. Additionally, if it is known that the U.S. has effective missile
defense systems that can be moved into theater quickly, it may devalue
ballistic missiles such that nations will decide not to pursue them. Of course
this does not say anything about a nations other possible opponents, but it
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may prevent them from using ballistic missiles if there is a chance of the U.S.
being drawn into the conflict.
2. Forward Presence
Forward presence of United States forces has been a key part of U.S.
foreign policy since the end of World War II. Forces in regions and areas of
vital interest to the United States have been instrumental in preventing
crises' from erupting. Yet defense cuts and the closing of many overseas bases
have prompted the Department of Defense to reevaluate the traditional
definitions of forward presence in order for the United States to continue to
fulfill its many obligations. In the new strategy, forward presence has been
expanded to include periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage
agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port
visits, and military-to-military contacts.9 Due to budgetary constraints the
number of personnel on the ground or at sea is going to be reduced, but
missions and activities considered as presence are going to expand.
A theater ballistic missile defense system can play a part of the
presence mission also. One possibility is a U.S. supported defense system in
allied countries that request it until they can develop one of their own. An
example is the Patriot batteries that were in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey
during the Gulf War and that remain in Turkey at the present time. One
question that this brings up is how willing will the U.S. leadership be to
"renting" American troops and defenses out to other countries, especially
during a period of America looking inward and withdrawing overseas forces?
Another possibility is to put ballistic missile defenses on ships and in that way
9 National Military Strategy 1992, 7.
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the United States can avoid the diplomatic and political complications of
having forces on the territory of other countries. The defenses would be part
of the naval diplomacy and peacetime engagement without having to be in
country. These defenses at sea would be able to protect ports, bases, the fleet,
pre-positioned equipment, and other allied civilians and interests from
possible missile attack. This of course depends on the area the sea-based
systems can defend. Finally, countries that buy or lease Patriot missile
batteries from the United States, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have, will
need United States forces to train them in its use and that can also be
considered presence or peacetime engagement.10
With the focus of the new strategy on regional contingencies, a
theater ballistic missile defense system can enhance crisis response capability.
The missile defense system, particularly a naval theater missile defense
system, can be relocated quickly during the initial phases of a crisis to provide
added stability and a wider range of prompt responses to the operational
commander. The missile defense system as an element of a maritime action
group (MAG), 11 serves as an important contributor to the immediate
operational capability of the United States in a crisis region. Thus, the theater
ballistic missile defense system contributes to the rapid-response capability of
U.S. forces.
l^Eric Schmitt, "Saudis to Buy 14 More Batteries of Patriot Missiles From the U.S.,"
New York Times, * November 1991, A3.
11 For a further discussion of the MAG concept, see Vice Admiral William Owens,




The capability to respond to a regional crises is another of the four
fundamental demands on the new strategy. There are a number of regional
contingencies that the United States could face and the strategy will be to limit
vertical and horizontal escalation and the time required to deal with the
crisis. Ballistic missiles threaten both vertical and horizontal escalation
control. Chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads cause a higher level of
destruction and provide incentive for the opposition to increase its retaliation
effort. Also, it is difficult to keep ballistic missiles within the borders of the
conflict, especially in areas like the Middle East where countries are only a few
hundred kilometers in length or width. A future United States theater
ballistic missile defense system on the ground or off-shore in a crises area
could take out ballistic missile attacks and help prevent vertical and
horizontal escalation of a conflict.
One of the most important roles that a theater ballistic missile
defense system can play in crisis response is that of rapid response and offense
suppression. A land-based missile defense in theater or a sea-based defense
that can be moved in quickly can perform offense suppression of ballistic
missile threats. It will reduce the threat to follow-on forces from ballistic
missiles by destruction or degradation of the adversary's attempts. This role
would be especially useful for a naval-based defense if the situation should
arise where the United States sees a need to respond to a crisis even though it
does not have any host nation support. The defense would prove useful in
protecting the amphibious troops and equipment from possible ballistic
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missile attack while they conduct their landing and establish a beachhead in
the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA).
Other major roles that a theater ballistic missile defense system can
play in crisis response is that of joint task force support and ground warfare
support. In joint operations, the missile defense systems can simultaneously
support both offensive and defensive tasks as designated by the operational
commander. Assuming the United States has been invited in to a crisis
region, the host nation will have provided port facilities, airfields, and supply
depots. Ballistic missile attacks on ports, airfields, and supply depots and lines
can severely delay actions and interrupt communications, supplies and air
support for troops on the ground. If there is any lesson learned by a potential
adversary of the United States from the Gulf War it would be to not allow the
United States to build up its forces in theater without some sort of opposition
early in a crises. A good way to do that would be with ballistic missile strikes,
particularly with non-conventional warheads, on ports of entry, airfields,
bases, and communications and command centers. Space, ground, and sea
based interceptors could all work jointly to prevent that from happening and
support a U.S. introduction force effort. Ballistic missile defenses will also
support the ground warfare troops by providing protection from ballistic
missile attacks when the offensive begins and protecting rear echelon troops
and supplies.
4. Reconstitution
The final fundamental pillar of the new defense strategy is the ability
to reconstitute totally new forces to fight a global war within a certain amount
of warning time. Reconstitution includes mobilizing manpower and fielding
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totally new combat units. It is also a reactivation of the defense industrial
base. Preserving that capability means protecting the infrastructure, the
defense industrial base, maintaining the lead in critical technologies, and
stockpiling critical materials. 12 Theater ballistic missile defenses fall into the
category of "maintaining the lead in critical technologies." If these defenses
are not fully funded through deployment or are cut, they could be maintained
in research and development under the "Reconstitution" aspect of the
strategy. In this way the technology will continue to be investigated and
maintained. Then if the political leadership of the nation determines that a
system is needed to face a significant threat, a system could be put together in
a relatively short time. Research and development would be needed so the
time to produce a system would not be as long as trying to develop a system
from ground zero.
B. CONSEQUENCES OF NOT FUNDING
One thing that should be examined is what effect not funding a theater
missile defense system would have on the new strategy. Even though the
Gulf War has probably given theater defenses a boost reflective in the new
Theater Missile Defense Initiative (TMDI) passed by Congress,! 3 it is
important to examine the consequences because of the possibility of a change
in administration, which may not wish to fund them, or a significant change
l^For a further discussion of what is considered under reconstitution, see National
Security Strategy of the United States, 29-31; National Military Strategy 1992, 7-8; and
James J. Tritten, "The New National Security Strategy and Base Force," in Reconstituting
National Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy, eds. James J. Tritten and Paul
N. Stockton (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 30 September 1991), 13,30-33.
•^Edward J. Walsh, "Navy Moves to Counter Ballistic Missiles," Sea Power
(September 1992), 3 9.
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in the strategic environment. Canceling the development of theater missile
defenses could have significant impacts on the new strategy.
The first impact that not funding missile defenses would have on strategy
is in the area of deterrence. With defenses, the United States has the ability to
ease the deterrence problem against Third World nations by having the
capability to defeat the ballistic missiles. Defenses are not the only way to
defeat ballistic missiles though; preemption is another option to have the
same capability. If the United States wants to maintain the capability to defeat
ballistic missiles before they become a problem to our allies, forces, and
interests, and not fund defenses, then the other option will be by using
preemptive strikes against those countries ballistic missile and mass
destruction weapons capability. The problem is that as the Gulf War showed,
it is extremely difficult to target and hit mobile ballistic missiles and their
launchers. As the case of Iraq showed, it is also difficult to detect an actual
chemical or biological weapons production facility. Finding the targets to
strike will require more intelligence assets, both technical and human, inside
the specific country to identify the targets. It will be even harder to launch a
preemptive strike if the opponent has the possibility of a retaliatory capability
against U.S. citizens abroad or vital interests.
If the United States does not want to deploy theater ballistic missile
defenses, then it will rely on deterrence through the threat of retaliation or
punishment. The problem here is that the United States will have to
determine what each separate Third World country values in order to hold
that at risk through the threat of retaliation or punishment and determine
the proper response. The other problem is that the rationality of some leaders
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are in question and rationality of the opposition is one of the requirements
for deterrence to be effective. However, rationality is not as important if
defenses or preemption are utilized as it is with deterrence through the threat
of retaliation or punishment because defenses or preemptive strikes take care
of the weapons if deterrence fails. It would also be important for the United
States to strengthen its efforts to limit proliferation of ballistic missiles
through multilateral arms controls and export controls.
In the area of forward presence, the lack of a theater ballistic missile
defense system would only have a minimal impact on the strategy. The
United States would not be able to offer the added stability a missile defense
system could give in certain presence regions. The defenses could also
prevent forward deployed U.S. forces from being exposed to excessive
vulnerability. It would also take away from a United States initial crisis
response capability.
Arguably the major impact of not funding theater ballistic missile
defenses would have on strategy is in the area of crisis response. Without
them it will be more difficult to limit the escalation of a conflict if ballistic
missiles are used. Iraq tried to draw Israel into the Gulf War by launching
ballistic missiles against them. That would likely have broken up the allied
coalition and caused a horizontal escalation of the conflict at the very least.
Also, there would not be protection for the joint task force or troops and
supplies in theater against ballistic missile attack.
The final impact of not funding missile defenses is in reconstitution. As
explained earlier, if theater missile defenses are not at least kept in research
and development, then it will take significantly longer to reconstitute a new
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missile defense system. Maintaining technological superiority is one of the
key aspects of reconstitution and if missile defenses are not actually deployed,
then research and development should continue. This will ensure the
United States maintains its technological edge and the capability to
reconstitute within a relatively short amount of time.
C CONCLUSIONS
This discussion of the roles that theater ballistic missile defense systems
can play in support of the new strategy is important for a number of reasons.
First, it demonstrates that ballistic missile defenses are implicitly an integral
part of the new national security strategy of regional contingencies. Second, it
shows how missile defense systems can support the joint contingency force
response in a crisis situation. They can add to the stability of regions due to
their presence alone. Third, the defenses can ease the burden of how the
deter Third World nations. Finally, continued research and development can
contribute to the United States maintaining its technological edge over all
potential enemies.
This discussion is not meant to portray the theater ballistic missile system
as the ultimate weapons system for the new world order. Instead, the
purpose of the presentation is to outline the various means in which a
missile defense system can contribute in this new international security
environment. It is an important contributor to deterrence, forward presence,
crisis response, and reconstitution. Table 3 summarizes these contributions
below.
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TABLE 3. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE ROLES
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A. WHAT USE AT SEA?
The end of the Cold War has been the watershed event for change in the
international and national security environments. The Soviet Union no longer
exists as a tangible global threat to American national security interests. The
uncertain threat of regional crises and contingencies has replaced the fear of
global war as the basis for U.S. defense forces. This fundamental change, as
enunciated in the National Security Strategy of the United States and the National
Military Strategy, requires a comprehensive reexamination of service strategies
and programming. This examination is well underway as each service struggles
to determine its contribution in the post-Cold War world.
The U.S. Navy has outlined its vision for the future in ...From The Sea:
Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century.^ This vision develops a general
framework for the contributions of naval forces to the new regional defense
strategy. What has yet to be determined is the exact contributions of each
element of U.S. naval forces. With that in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to
describe the contributions a naval theater ballistic missile defense system can
make to the Navy's new direction as derived from the new military strategy. The
naval contributions and associated missions or tasks will be discussed at the
strategic, operational, and tactical level. Additionally, the advantages of a sea-
based system over a land-based system will be discussed where they apply.
1 Department of the Navy, ...From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Servicefor the 21st Century
(Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Navy, 30 September 1992).
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1. Strategic Direction
In facing the strategic demands of a new international security
environment the Navy has derived a new strategic direction from the National
Security Strategy of the United States. This new direction of the Navy and Marine
Corps is to provide the United States with Naval Expeditionary Forces that are
shaped for joint operations and to operate forward from the sea, tailored for
national needs. 2 This strategic direction represents a fundamental shift away
from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations conducted from
the sea. The Navy and Marine Corps will be able to respond to crises and can
provide the initial capability for joint operations as well as continued
participation in any sustained effort. In addition to the new direction, the Navy
continues to be a major part of the nations strategic deterrent.^
The first two strategic directions for the Navy are to provide Naval
Expeditionary Forces that are shaped for joint operations and operating forward
from the sea. These two directions are derived from the strategic fundamentals
of forward presence and crisis response as stated in the new national security
strategy. The expeditionary forces will be available for tasking in the full range
of joint operations with the other services to provide a cohesive joint team that is
capable of rapid and decisive action from peacetime forward presence and
exercises to joint missions in a major crisis. These Naval and Marine Corps forces
can be continuously tailored to meet the presence missions or to meet any
developing crisis. As discussed in the previous chapter, a theater ballistic missile
defense system can have significant roles to play with these forces that includes
2.
..From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Servicefor the 21st Century, 2.
3Ibid.
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peacetime engagement, naval diplomacy, and enhanced crisis response
capability in presence missions and limiting escalation, offense suppression, joint
task force support, and ground warfare support in crisis response missions.
The third strategic direction for the Navy is to continue to be a major
part of the nations strategic deterrent. This direction includes both nuclear
deterrence and conventional strategic defense. This direction is the only area the
Navy explicitly states that it is examining theater missiles defenses and the naval
capabilities that can contribute to a strategic defense.4 Here again a theater
ballistic missile defense can ease the burden of how the deter Third World
nations by providing the capability to defeat and to possibly devalue an
adversary's ballistic missile force.
2. Operational Capabilities
With a new strategic direction for the Navy and Marine Corps team
comes new operational directions. Instead of the intercontinental power
projection and command of the seas during the Cold War, the Navy is entering a
transoceanic phase that will focus on littoral operations. The littoral is the "near
land" areas of the world and is defined as two segments of the battlespace. The
first segment is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore which must be
controlled to support operations ashore. The second segment is the landward
area inland from shore that can be supported and defended directly from the
sea.^ The littoral region will include narrow seas and coastal areas and can be
characterized by confined and congested water and air space. Command of the




and adaptations of existing forces and new operational capabilities to counter
littoral threats. ...From the Sea delineates that the four key operational capabilities
needed to successfully execute the new direction of the Navy and Marine Corps
are: (1) Command, Control, and Surveillance; (2) Battlespace Dominance; (3)
Power Projection; and (4) Force Sustainment.6
a. Command, Control, and Surveillance
The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to structure command
and control capabilities to promote efficient joint and combined operations as
part of an overarching command, control, and communications architecture that
will be able to adapt from sea to shore. This way there can be a smooth transition
from sea to land in a regional contingency effort once the task force commander
is shifted to land. The surveillance efforts will continue to emphasize
exploitation of space and electronic systems to provide commanders with
immediate information, while denying and /or managing the data available to
the enemy. Command, control, and surveillance systems enable domination of
the battlespace and power projection, and are central to the precise application of
power/
A naval-based missile defense system and its supporting
components can be an important part of the command, control, and surveillance
capabilities. Space-based surveillance systems such as DSP and Brilliant Eyes
(BE) or aircraft surveillance could provide early detection of ballistic missile
launches and pass that information to sea-based and /or ground-based defense




launchers and supporting infrastructure so that counterfire strikes could be
brought in to disable the enemy's further use of that launch platform. For
command and control, the naval-based radar could be integrated with sensor
data from aircraft, satellites, and the Ground Based Radar (GBR) to create a
network that would provide theater-wide capabilities in detecting and tracking
incoming missiles, and cueing interceptors to target them.8 Once land forces
have entered the theater, sea-based and land-based systems could be able to
communicate with one another to provide joint coordination through cooperative
engagements and therefore provide a larger overall engagement footprint
throughout the theater.^
b. Battlespace Dominance
Battlespace dominance is at the heart of future naval warfare. It
means that the United States forces can maintain access from the sea to permit
the effective entry of equipment and resupply. This dominance implies that
Naval Forces can bring to bear decisive power on and below the sea, on land, and
in the air. 10 This also implies that Naval Forces will be the "enabling" force that
will enable joint combat operations to begin and proceed in a regional
contingency. They must have the capability to deny access to a regional
adversary, interdict the adversary's movement of supplies by sea, and control the
local sea, shore, and air. Dominating the battlespace means ensuring effective
"james Hackett, "Give Antimissile Role to Navy: Mobile Ships Could Offer Wide-Area
Scud Defense," Defense News, August 17-23, 1992, 19; and "SDI Request of $4.36 Billion
Represents 30 Percent Boost," Defense News, February 3, 1992, 8-10.
^Presentation prepared by Capt. R.P. Rempt, OP-75, Navy TBMD Program (Washington,
D.C.: US Department of the Navy, OP-75, 4 March 1992).
^...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, 8.
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transition from open ocean to littoral areas, and from sea to land and back, to
accomplish the full range of potential missions. 11
As battlespace dominance is at the heart of future naval warfare,
sea-based theater ballistic missile defenses are at the heart of battlespace
dominance. In future regional contingencies the battlespace to be dominated will
be in and around the littoral area. In order for the Navy to be the enabling force,
it must have control of the littoral. Ballistic missile attacks in littoral areas could
severely hamper or delay any U.S. joint combat operations. These attacks could
be against airfields that the joint task force would use, ports that the task force
would use to bring in heavy equipment and supplies, Amphibious Objective
Areas (AOA) that the Marines are attempting to establish, and with the addition
of terminal guidance, on naval and amphibious ships themselves. With reduced
maneuverability due to being in congested and confined waters of the littoral, it
may not be as difficult for an adversary to target naval vessels with ballistic
missiles. In order to gain control of the littoral, the Navy must be able to defeat
this anticipated threat. In order to be the enabling force, it must gain control of
the littoral. A sea-based theater ballistic missile defense system can protect the
enabling force and protect vital ports and airfields for the follow-on ground and
air combat units. That can prevent any delay or disabling of a U.S. crisis
response ability. Without a ballistic missile defense, naval forces may have to
standoff outside of ballistic missile range and not be able to move in and gain
control of the littoral.
An example of this kind of potential problem to ports and ships can
be shown from the Gulf War. During the Gulf War, an impressive armada of
11 Ibid.
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Western warships surrounded the Arabian Peninsula. Led by five U.S. aircraft
carrier battle groups operating in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and the
eastern Mediterranean, the naval force in the region was enormous. Yet, when
Iraq began firing Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia, the force was not
much help. The carrier attack jets did not have the range to go Scud hunting and
the Scuds turned out to be much harder to find than anyone expected. The ships
were unable to defend U.S. forces on land or allied population centers, even
though most Scud targets were close to sea. The protection of U.S. forces and
allies was left to the limited-area defense of the Patriot. The Navy did not
consider the Scud much of a threat to its ships, but there was concern for the
safety of ammunition and supply ships tied for days unloading their cargoes at
docks at Dhahran. While none were hit, they presented an inviting target and
several Scuds fell in the water nearby. 12 This is just an example of how ports
and ships were targeted and in the future they are likely to be more at risk. If the
Navy is going to gain battlespace dominance of the littoral, a sea-based ballistic
missile defense should be a part of that "enabling" force.
c. Power Projection
Once the enabling force has gained control of the littoral, U.S.
combat power will be projected inland to deal with any regional adversary. The
Navy and Marine Corps supports the decisive sea-air-land battle by providing




..From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Servicefor the 21st Century, 8-9.
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A sea-based theater ballistic missile defense system can play the
critical role of protecting the Marines from ballistic missile attack when they go
ashore. Initially, the defenses can be used to protect the ground troops and
heavy equipment as it is being landed and the airfields where heavy airlift is
coming into theater. Once the control of the contingency force is shifted to land
and land-based defenses are in place, the sea-based defenses can be freed up for
whatever missions the joint task force commander sees fit. This can include
patrolling of the coast of coalition partners to provide protection and stability,
moving to cover mobile ground units that have moved forward outside the land-
based systems footprint, and continuing to protect the sea-based assets in theater.
d. Force Sustainment
America's influence and regional contingency capability is
dependent upon its ability to sustain military operations where needed. The
Navy is a large part of that logistics support required for any sustained military
operations. It is tasked to provide a comprehensive and responsive logistics
support system, including air and sealift, replenishment ships, mobile repair
facilities, and advanced logistic support hubs. The Navy is also responsible to
ensure open sea lanes of communication so that passage of shipping is not
impeded by an adversary. 14
A sea-based theater ballistic missile defense system can play an
important role in force sustainment by protecting the forward logistics and sealift
vessels. As these ships move through straits, into confining littoral waters, and
pierside to unload their cargo, they will be inviting targets to an adversary. One
of the best ways to reach them is via a ballistic missile attack. A sea-based
14Ibid., 9.
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defense system can provide protection and prevent an adversary from
interrupting the resupply and combat support effort. The advantage of a sea-
based system here is its inherent mobility so that it could move with the
Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS) or the sealift vessels as they move into the
theater.
Included in the operational capabilities of a sea-based theater ballistic
missile defense system, there are also tactical uses. Those are to specifically use
them for protection of ships operating in the littoral and Marines as they move
ashore. Without defenses, if a terminally-guided ballistic missile is launched into
a Surface Action Group (SAG) or Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) in the littoral,
it can be almost assured to hit some unit. Due to their high-speed, the reaction
time for passive countermeasures would be very short. An active defense is
required to defeat such a future threat and protect sea-based assets.
B. SCENARIO EXAMPLE
In order to help demonstrate how a theater ballistic missile defense system
can be useful in future regional contingencies a scenario was examined to
determine their possible impact. The scenario examined was the Tactical Missile
Defense Warfare Analysis Laboratory Exercise (TMD WALEX) done by the Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in support of the U.S. Army
Anti-Tactical Missile Program Review Panel. 15 The actual scenario parameters,
weapons parameters, timelines, and responses are classified and will not be
discussed. The general scenarios and the general findings made by this study are
^Tactical Missile Defense Warfare Analysis laboratory Exercise (TMD WALEX) Report, Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University,
October 1990). All of the major ideas and findings described in this section can be directly
attributed to the above report.
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discussed below to show the importance a ballistic missile defense system can
have in regional contingencies.
The TMD WALEX was directed to focus upon the Third World TBM threat
in the late 1990's. Korean and Persian Gulf scenarios were chosen to provide
representative operational situations that would illustrate TMD requirements. In
the Korean scenario, North Korea invades South Korea and initially makes rapid
progress south. However, the tide turns against North Korea and BLUE forces
begin to win. A month-or-so into the war, BLUE executes an amphibious
landing campaign to cut North Korean forward forces off from their northern
logistical base. The Persian Gulf scenario assumed that U.S. forces have
withdrawn from Saudi Arabia within a couple of years after the 1990 Persian
Gulf crisis. Then several years later, Iraq again invades Kuwait, and, in this
scenario, continues into Saudi Arabia, advancing down the Persian Gulf coast
nearly as far as Bahrain. U.S. and other Western forces do not become involved
until after Iraqi forces have established themselves in these positions. From an
analysis of these two scenarios and the way they played out a few general
conclusions were found.
The first general finding was that without a theater missile defense, ballistic
missile use by an adversary in a regional conflict can deny some significant BLUE
missions. For example, adversary ballistic missile attacks could deny the U.S.
use of an airfield or port as a major entry point for U.S. forces into the regional
theater. Some BLUE missions could be denied by ballistic missiles with any kind
of warhead; other missions could be denied if ballistic missiles are employed as
weapons of mass effect by using chemical or nuclear warheads. Sophisticated
use of different kinds of warheads (e.g., target-activated submunitions on some
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TBMs, chemical warheads on others) can make clean-up after a TBM attack very-
difficult. Ballistic missiles may provide a weapons delivery mechanism to attack
targets at ranges that otherwise could not be reached by the adversary and allow
him to do so with minimum warning time.
The next general finding was that it is better to prevent ballistic missile
launch, either by attacking TBM sites and supporting infrastructure or by
denying required targeting and C^ which supports TBMs, than to counter TBMs
after launch. However, it was recognized that some operational situations may
make it impossible to attack TBMs prior to launch and it is unlikely that BLUE
would always be able to destroy or deny launch by every adversary TBM.
Adversary use of ballistic missiles at the commencement of hostilities is likely to
ensure that at least the first volley of missiles is launched. The cost of attacking
TBM launch sites and supporting infrastructure could result in large aircraft
losses.
The third general finding was that ballistic missile defense system
transportability and mobility required are situation dependent. If a defense
system is not in place prior to commencement of the war, it can be brought in the
same way as other heavy forces. It is important that ballistic missile defense
capability exist as heavy forces enter the area. It is unlikely that heavy-lift
aircraft would be flown into an airfield subject to TBM attack. Here we see how
a sea-based system could be vitally important in the beginning of a crisis to
protect airfields and ports as forces are being moved into theater.
Fourth, space assets were recognized as very important for TMD but specific
roles and integration were not addressed. Problems associated with rapid
introduction of a TMD system into a new area would be greatly alleviated if
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initial target detection and tracking could be accomplished by space-based or
airborne assets.
Finally, ballistic missiles bring a new dimension into regional conflict. TBMs
give an adversary the ability to reach far into BLUE territory with a high
likelihood of mission success. Without effective TMD, BLUE forces will not be
able to perform some missions, especially in regions where the U.S. does not
have predeployed forces, and the adversary has the ability to control conflict
escalation. For example, TBM use against the airport of Riyadh in the Persian
Gulf scenario would have prevented use of that airport by heavy-lift aircraft.
BLUE adaptation to a campaign under such conditions could be very costly in
terms of the larger size and longer duration of the operations required. BLUE
operational flexibility could be severely limited without effective TMD.
C CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. Navy has derived a new vision from the National Military Strategy.
...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century develops a general
framework for the contributions to the new regional defense strategy. The Navy
has recognized the threat that ballistic missiles can pose in the future and is
specifically examining the role that theater ballistic missile defenses can fill in
strategic defense. What this chapter has tried to show is that these defenses can
play a much bigger role across the spectrum of naval warfare in future
contingencies. As just one element of U.S. naval forces, they can contribute to the
operational capabilities needed to successfully execute the new direction of the
Navy and Marine Corps. In doing so, they can provide the task force
commander a broad area of mission assignments to which they can be tasked.
Working in coordination with land-based systems and space and air assets, they
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can provide a theater-wide defense against ballistic missile attacks. The
advantages of a sea-based system lies in the fact that the Navy forces may be the
first into a crisis region and the inherent mobility that can let them cover assets
that a land-based system cannot. Table 4 summarizes the missions and tasks that
a sea-based defense system can perform to support the Navy's operational
capabilities.
TABLE 4. NAVAL TMD OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

















Force Sustainment Sealift Protection
Port Protection
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V. HOW DO WE GET THERE?
A. AEGIS
The last chapter demonstrated that the Navy can make a substantial theater
missile defense contribution beyond traditional Navy missions. The Navy may
have the only on-the-scene missile defense capability at the onset of many
conflicts and will be sorely needed for defense of both sea and air ports-of-entry
and for protection of amphibious landing forces. With that in mind, this chapter
examines how the Navy could deploy a sea-based theater ballistic missile
defense system in the not too distant future. It will examine the platform to be
used, certain upgrades required, and potential problems that could prevent
actual employment.
The Navy's Aegis Combat System (ACS) is the most obvious answer to the
question of what platform to use. It is attractive because there are already
existing platforms, with more being built in cruisers and destroyers, that have
launchers, sensors, and supporting infrastructure. This way the Navy does not
have to build a theater ballistic missile defense platform from the keel up, but can
upgrade the existing platforms. This can save money, which is important during
a period of declining budgets, and can provide the defense capability sooner than
if it had to construct a totally new platform.
Aegis provides an all-weather capability for independent and Task Force
Antiair Warfare (AAW) operations. To support AAW operations, the ACS
provides surveillance systems for target detection and identification; tracking
computers to maintain a target track file of targets detected by ownship
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surveillance systems or reported over data links and to evaluate target threats
and assign weapons; weapon systems for target engagement; and
countermeasures systems to mask ownship and to decoy weapons launched by
an enemy. 1 The following systems are used to detect targets and provide data to
the computer track file: 2 multifunction Radar System AN/SPY-1B/D,
Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) System, and Electronic Warfare (EW) System.
AN/SPY-1B/D is the air surveillance and fire control radar system that searches
preassigned volumes in space and automatically detects and tracks targets. The
IFF System interrogates targets, maintains a file of IFF target reports, and
provides this data to the Command & Decision (C & D) system in both video and
digital format. The EW System detects target emitters, analyzes target
signatures, and provides an early warning of targets.
The ACS has significant proven capability against a broad variety of AAW
threats. However, it was not designed to counter theater ballistic missiles. Even
so, the current ACS can provide ballistic missile tracking via the AN/SPY-1 radar
as well as a limited engagement capability against the low end ballistic missile
threat with some modification.^ However, to effectively improve the current
ACS capability against today's more advanced third world ballistic missile
threats and the projected future threats, certain upgrades and developments
should be initiated. The major upgrades that will be discussed are in cueing and
defensive warhead lethality issues.
^Near-Term Department of the Navy T/TBMD Capability Final Report, Fleet Systems
Department, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (Laurel, MD: Johns





A cue is information from an external source that a ballistic missile
launch has occurred and provides some information which identifies and
characterizes the ballistic missile and its trajectory. An external cue can minimize
the effect of the reaction-time delays of the defensive system. This can permit
firing of the defensive missile several moments sooner. In turn, this can permit
increased depth of fire. This corresponding increase in kill probabilities for a
given defended area translates into an increased effective footprint. Possible
sources that could cue the Aegis system are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
Space systems, such as the Defense Support Program (DSP) system and
its upgrades, and more capable systems, such as the Brilliant Eyes (BE) satellite
constellation, can provide significant contributions to all theater ballistic missile
defense systems, including Aegis. A cue from space providing the location of a
ballistic missile launch or a more exact threat-missile flight path can allow a
ground-based or sea-based system to defend areas two to four times larger than
could be defended without assistance from spaced Two DSP spacecraft could
view a launch event to improve the accuracy of the tracking and trajectory
prediction and then pass that information to the defense systems. BE is a
distributed satellite system that will use infrared (IR) sensors to track threat
missiles from launch through midcourse and reentryP
^Defense Science Board Study Final Report on Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.
US Department of Defense, 19 March 1992), 2.
5Ibid., 25.
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The contribution of space systems is "alerting", that is recognizing that a
missile has been launched and sending a message used to turn on radars or
change modes and warn personnel. An example of the use of such a cue would
be if the Aegis platform was performing its normal AAW surveillance, the cue
would provide it a chance to switch to ballistic missile surveillance. If the cue
were sufficiently accurate, the Aegis would only have to look into a limited
search volume to acquire the target. The benefit of the cue would be in
minimizing the time it takes the AN/SPY-1 to acquire the target. This would
allow for earlier engagement and minimize the impact of its ballistic missile
defense mission on the overall AAW mission.
The related result is that cueing from space assets can enhance a defense
systems footprint. Under uncued operation, the Aegis radar would search a
relatively large threat volume and, when the incoming object is detected, track it
for eventual intercept. By providing early launch detection, localization, and
trajectory information, a space system can allow the cued radar to search a much
smaller threat volume, and therefore detect the threat objects at longer ranges.
6
This leads to larger areas that can be defended.
Other external cueing sources that can provide the Aegis with quicker
reaction time and larger defense areas are airborne surveillance, such as the E-2C,
and ground-based radars, such as the theater Ground Based Radar (GBR) the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) is developing.7 Potential
problems here are that at the beginning of a crisis the GBR or other land-based
6Ibid., 27.
'Concept of operations for the E-2C in theater missile defense was derived from a
presentation by Capt. R.P. Rempt, OP-75, Navy TBMD Program (Washington, D.C.: US
Department of the Navy, OP-75, 4 March 1992).
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radars may not be in place. Until control of the littoral is established, Navy assets
may be all that is in theater. If an adversary has an extensive air defense
network, the airborne surveillance may not be able to provide the coverage
needed to detect a launch. Additionally, airborne or ground-based radars may
not be able to discriminate threat objects from decoys, fragments, or other
penetration aids during the exoatmospheric phase of the missile flight.
Once any or all of these external sources are in place, they can provide
early warning cues to both sea- and land-based defense systems. They can be a
significant part of the effort to provide the operational commander an effective,
cooperative theater-wide ballistic missile defense system.
2. Defensive Warhead Lethality
Successful fleet or theater defense against ballistic missiles requires an
ability to neutralize all types of ballistic missile payloads. Future warhead
threats that one can reasonably expect to see fielded might employ nuclear,
chemical, biological, incendiary, and conventional high-explosive, with the
possibility that any of these (except nuclear) may be contained in submunitions.
The robust physical makeup of some ballistic missile payloads drives antiair
defensive weapons systems to achieve higher energy levels on target than has
ever been previously required. Intercept of a biological warfare or chemical
warfare weapon, which consists of a large tank at inside a reentry shield,
involves some very tricky lethality problems. Unlike a nuclear or high-explosive
weapon, the agents are ready to work when released from their tanks. The
intercept may actually perform part of the attacker's job by spreading the agent
around. However, if the intercept occurs at a sufficiently high altitude,
laboratory tests show that a chemical agent will be dispersed enough to be
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innocuous. 8 Knowledge of biological agents dispersal has not been fully
developed at this time although it seems that even an intermediate altitude
intercept may help the aggressor with dispersal of the agent for its intended use.
9
Lethality against ballistic missiles carrying submunitions of any type involves
new considerations for the defense community. The submunitions shield each
other and may be very hard so that a massive kinetic energy impact may be
needed to provide assurance of killing all or a significant fraction of the
submunitions. 10 Therefore, any upgrades to the Standard (SM-2) missile
planned for a theater ballistic missile defense role will probably require a new
ordnance package at the very least.
Once an intercept is made, the issue of whether or not a kill occurred
remains. The two ways to look at this are hard kill and mission kill. Hard kill
means that no damage has been done to allied assets, and mission kill means that
no damage has been done to the intended targets. Mission kill means that the
incoming ballistic missile has been diverted to miss the intended target. This is
usually better than a miss, but there is probably no way to count on this kill
mechanism in defense of population centers or if the warhead on the ballistic
missile is nuclear, chemical or biological. Killing the incoming missile warhead is
not the only problem because missile debris, including the missile body, can
impact a target area and cause a great deal of disruption, although less than if the
warhead had detonated on target. Part of the solution to this problem is to
engage the ballistic missile for a hard kill at as high an altitude as far from the




defended area as possible. The two main kill mechanisms being assessed for
theater missile defense warheads are fragment warheads, as on the SM-2, and
hit-to-kill (HTK) warheads, as in the case of the Extended Range Intercept
Technology (ERINT) being developed by LTV Missiles and Aerospace Co. and
the Theater High-altitude Area Defense (THAAD) weapon planned for
development by SDIO.H
The effectiveness of a fragment kill is determined by a variety of factors:
the number of fragments hitting the incoming missile/warhead body, the energy
and size of the fragments, where the fragments hit, fragment strike angle,
fragment material, fragment mass, and the shape and on the nature of the target
warhead. The use of the SM-2 missile and present warhead to defeat incoming
ballistic missiles presents two areas of concern. The high interceptor-to-ballistic
missile closing velocity and the forward area of the target's vulnerable area make
it difficult to place fragments on the vulnerable area and, given that the warhead
fragments strike the vulnerable portion of the target, they may be too small to
cause sufficient damage.^ The current recommendations in response to those
concerns for SM-2 warhead upgrades are to increase the velocity of the fragments
and change their ejection angle to get better shot at the vulnerable areas of the
incoming missile and to increase the fragment size. 13 These are meant to give a
higher probability of hitting and killing the incoming missile.
^Edward J. Walsh, "Navy Moves to Counter Ballistic Missiles," Sea Power (September
1992), 39-40; and Defense Science Board Study Final Report on Ballistic Missile Defense, C-20.
^Near-Term Department of the Navy T/TBMD Capability Final Report, 4-140.
13 Ibid., 4-146.
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However, the difficulty of accomplishing fragment kills varies
drastically among threat warhead types. In the case of unitary high-explosive or
chemical warheads, the fragments can hit with enough mass and velocity to
achieve a hard kill. 14 it is still unclear though as to their effectiveness against
biological/chemical submunition warheads.
A great deal of progress has been make over the last few years in HTK
technology. The appeal of the HTK approach is the possibility of imparting large
amounts of energy to a target system with the promise of totally destroying the
target. The energy imparted is largely dependent on the mass and it will be
important for the development of HTK warheads that the minimum effective
HTK mass be quantified for the various target warheads. 15 HTK holds a great
deal of promise, yet it is once again unclear as to how effective it may be against
biological/chemical submunitions. Further testing and evaluation of ERINT and
THAAD, and the more advanced HTK technology like the hypervelocity
projectile to be used in the Lightweight Exoatmospheric Agile Projectile (LEAP)
Program being developed by Boeing and Hughes, will hopefully make this
capability a reality in the not too distant future. Table 5 summarizes the assessed
destruction capabilities of the two kill mechanisms.16





































The principal problem with the HTK mechanism is that, as the name
implies, the warhead must hit the ballistic missile to kill it. HTK missiles will
also have to hit the ballistic missile at the right place to be totally effective. That
will require precise guidance and control. This is a significant problem
considering the complicated geometry involved in intercept. With extremely
high closing velocities between the ballistic missile and the interceptor,
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complicated by ballistic missiles with possible maneuvering warheads, this
problem will take significant effort to overcome.
B. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND TRADEOFFS
The threat recognition of ballistic missiles in the Third World and a
recognition of the roles that theater ballistic missile defenses can play in a
regional defense strategy may not be enough. An Aegis-based theater ballistic
missile defense, and for that matter, any theater ballistic missile defense must
face some potential problems and tradeoffs before becoming a realistic capability.
First, it must face the hurdle of political-ideological opposition, which has leaned
towards enforcing a narrower view of United States obligations under the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union. Second, it must face
the issue of costs required to build and deploy such a system, particularly in a
period of increasingly limited defense budgets. Finally, the Aegis-based missile
defense must face the critical tradeoffs and critical pacing technologies that must
be accounted for to produce an effective ballistic missile defense system.
To advocates of arms control, the ABM Treaty is the signal achievement of
U.S. -Soviet arms controls efforts. To the Reagan and Bush Administrations, it is
an undesirable obstacle to the development and deployment of a strategic
defense system. The ABM Treaty constrains the development and deployment of
strategic ballistic missile defenses with the exception that both sides are allowed
100 ground-based interceptors to be deployed at one site each.*? Neither
country is allowed to deploy or develop sea-, air-, space-, or mobile land-based
•'The United States decided to place its system at an ICBM site at Grand Forks, ND
while the Soviet Union deployed their system around Moscow.
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ABM systems or transfer the technology to any third parties. 18 Nowhere does
the ABM Treaty explicitly refer to theater missile defenses. It addresses only so-
called "ABM systems" and defines them as defenses against "strategic missiles".
The Treaty is an issue because the distinction between the performance and
technical capabilities of ABM and theater systems is unclear today and likely to
become progressively less clear as ballistic missile threats grow in range and
capability and as technology increases the effectiveness of defenses against them.
The strategic situation has changed considerably since the treaty was signed
some twenty years ago. The reality of a larger global problem, particularly after
the Gulf War, appears to have been recognized by Congress. Last year, Congress
directed the SDIO to develop a limited defense system compliant with the 1972
ABM Treaty that could be deployed by 1996, directed that the U.S. to open talks
with the Soviets (Commonwealth of Independent States or individual republics)
to allow more than 100 interceptors at more than one site, and for the U.S. to
consider all options available within the ABM Treaty (to many Congressmen, this
includes the possibility of unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty). 19 This year,
Congress directed SDIO to create a new theater missile defense initiative. At the
present time, theater missile defenses may be safe from the ABM Treaty, but the
United States should either reach an understanding with the former Soviet Union
about theater missile defenses or recognize that in the new security environment,
the ABM Treaty may have outlived its usefulness.
l^VVilliam J. Durch, The Future of the ABM Treaty, Adelphi Paper 223, (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), 5-8.
^Congressional Quarterly, 9 November 1991, 3295.
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A second major obstacle to the development and deployment of a theater
ballistic missile defense system is the reducing defense budget. The defense
budget is expected to drop by approximately fifty billion dollars over the next
five years.20 The new administration may reduce the defense budget even more.
With that in mind, it is important to look at the record of the SDI/GPALS
program. A total of 25.5 billion dollars has been spent on research and
development for SDI/GPALS up through the 1992 budget cycle.21 It has run
from 4.4% of the R & D budget in 1985 to 10% of the R & D budget in 1992. That
is a significant portion of the R&D budget for a program that has not been
deployed yet. The Congressional Budget Office has considered the costs for
various alternatives.22 Pursuing the Bush Administration's plan of deploying
theater defenses, multiple interceptor sites covering the U.S. and space-based
interceptors, and continuing advanced research would cost 87.5 billion from
1993-2005. Eliminating the space-based interceptors would cut the cost to 53.9
billion. Research, theater defenses and a 100 interceptor site would cost 36.4
billion. Finally, an option that would deploy only theater defenses and maintains
1.2 billion a year in research would cost 27.5 billion. President-elect Bill Clinton
has stated that he wants to develop and deploy theater missile defense systems
immediately and possibly a ground-based strategic system compliant with the
^U.S. Department of Defense, Budget Briefing with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney;
Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood; and General Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 29 January 1992.
21 All raw numbers on SDI/GPALS budget came from Congressional Quarterly, 1985-1992.
22james R. Asker, "ABM Enthusiasm Wanes in Congress, Sets Stage for New SDI
Funding Fight," Aviation Week & Space Technology, (March 16, 1992), 45.
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ABM Treaty.23 A good sign is that all options discussed by the Congressional
Budget Office and the President-elect include funding for theater ballistic missile
defenses.
A sea-based missile defense from an Aegis construct has an advantage with
budgets because of its possible lower costs and risks. Projected funding for
upgrades described in this report to provide a theater missile defense capability
on Aegis through the year 2000 is between 3 and 4.5 billion dollars.24 Upgrades
for a more limited area defense capability is projected to be around 1.5 billion
dollars.25 The main performance differences between the two capabilities are
that the limited area defense would have a minimum defended radius of 50-200
kilometers and a minimum keep-out altitude of 10 kilometers, while the theater
defense would have a minimum defended radius of greater than 200 kilometers
and keep-out altitude of 20-50 kilometers.26 The full theater defense capability
on Aegis would only be about 12% of the funding for the Congressional Budget
Office's third option and the President-elect's plan. The potential problem is that
most of the funding is projected to come from SDIO through the theater missile
defense initiative and not Navy funding. If it does not, and has to come from
Navy funding, that could pose a significant problem in that the funding would
have to come from other planned Navy projects or not at all.
23william Matthews and Tom Philpott, "Bush vs. Clinton," Navy Times 52 (October 5,
1992), 8-10.




The final obstacle comes from critical tradeoffs and critical pacing
technologies that could effect the employment of a ballistic missile defense on
Aegis cruisers and destroyers. First among these involves the detection and
tracking of ballistic missiles. Because of the ballistic missile's extremely high
speed and high trajectory, the energy required in upgrades to direct the radar to
higher altitudes and to search a larger space volume in a ballistic missile defense
mode is very significant. Detection and tracking also requires more energy
because of the complicated geometry of the problem. While the Aegis is in a
ballistic missile defense mode, significant degradations are made to its other
AAW missions. Since it will be operating in the littoral, it is reasonable to
assume that there will be other threats from an adversary's aircraft and cruise
missiles at the same time. As discussed in earlier sections, external cueing
sources can minimize the degradation of ballistic missile defense on the other
AAW missions. However, if these external sources are not available for
whatever reasons, then the Navy must operationally consider having at least
two Aegis platforms in each area of the littoral it is trying to defend. One would
perform ballistic missile defense and one would perform the conventional AAW
missions. This is significant because this operational requirement could possible
be one of the future drivers for force structure requirements on the number of
Aegis platforms in the Navy.
Arguably, the most critical item facing the deployment of a sea-based theater
ballistic missile defense is the issue of developing a warhead that can defeat all
possible future ballistic missile threats. As discussed earlier, fragmentation
warheads may not be that effective against all future threats, although upgrades
in fragment velocity, ejection angle, and fragment mass may make them slightly
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more effective. The key right now is to develop a HTK warhead that can
intercept and defeat any future ballistic missile. The development of a warhead
to kill future ballistic missile warheads at as high an altitude and as far away
from the defended area as possible is critical to the deployment of an effective
theater ballistic missile defense as envisioned in this report.
Even with the development of such a warhead with proper guidance and
control, there may be tradeoffs to consider. That warhead may be unique in that
it could only be used for ballistic missile defense. If that is the case, there would
have to be a magazine mix on the Aegis. That would mean that some cells and
launchers would have to be dedicated to ballistic missile defense. That would
take away from the number of missiles available for other AAW and strike
missions. Therefore, each ship would have a limited number of shots at ballistic
missiles and a limited number of shots at aircraft and/or cruise missiles. This
leaves open the possibility for the ship or the area it is trying to defend to be
saturated or overwhelmed by the adversary. Once again this might lead to the
operational necessity of having at least two Aegis platforms in the area for
defense with one ship dedicated to ballistic missile defense and one ship to
conventional AAW.
C CONCLUSIONS
The Navy has the capability to make a substantial contribution to theater
missile defense. A major part of the infrastructure is already in place with the
Aegis Combat System. It is more cost effective and lower risk because there are
already existing platforms and some capability that can be upgraded to provide
an effective theater ballistic missile defense system. An example is how the
PATRIOT was upgraded from a conventional AAW defense to include capability
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against ballistic missiles. There are a number of software and hardware
upgrades that can be made with existing technology right now that will help
improve performance against ballistic missiles. However, the two most critical
items needed to make Aegis an effective, flexible and mobile ballistic missile
defense platform are external sources of cueing and a warhead and missile with
proper guidance and control that can defeat all future ballistic missile threats.
While those items are being investigated, the Navy should still press on so that
even a limited sea-based missile defense system can be deployed as soon as
possible so that it will not take much effort to integrate future enhancements that
will provide the United States with an effective theater ballistic missile defense
capability.
There are some potential problems or "show stoppers" involved with this
endeavor. The most worrisome are budgets and the development of a warhead
to defeat the future missile threats. Without the funding, the program will go
nowhere. Without an effective warhead or funding, U.S. forces, allied forces and
civilians, and U.S. interests may be at stake.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
For years, the United States has lived in the shadow of Soviet nuclear armed
ballistic missiles. As the Cold War has ended and tensions between the United
States and the former Soviet Union have eased, the strategic threat of global
nuclear war has diminished considerably. Yet, while this threat is diminishing, a
new threat is emerging. In the new international system, ballistic missile
proliferation and related weapons of mass destruction are one of the major
threats to stability in the new security environment. In the past two years
attention has become more focused on ballistic missile proliferation due to Iraq's
arsenal of ballistic missiles, which it used against Israel and Saudi Arabia during
the Gulf War, and Iran and Iraq's use of ballistic missiles against population
centers in the 1988 "War of the Cities". Ballistic missile systems are becoming
increasingly prominent in Third World arsenals and are seen as destabilizing
weapons that are a threat to regional peace and American vital interests in
certain regions.
Today, some twenty nations either possess or are in the process of acquiring
ballistic missiles. These nations have pursued ballistic missiles for a number of
reasons that fall under the categories of military-strategic, political-diplomatic,
and economic reasons. Military-strategic reasons are to increase the offensive
capability of a nation in order to improve their strike capabilities and for
deterrence. Under political-diplomatic reasons are the political leverage and
psychological impact that ballistic missiles give, the fact that ballistic missiles are
symbols of prestige and technological achievement, and they show a
commitment to a strong defense. Economic reasons are to promote economic
development and to possibly use them as export sales.
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Due to the fact that Third World countries are developing and acquiring
ballistic missiles for a variety of reasons and will continue to do so, present
means of control may not be enough to diffuse the threat of ballistic missile
proliferation. The present methods of export controls, arms control, and
deterrence do not hold much promise of stopping the proliferation of ballistic
missiles, although they may slow it somewhat. It is for those reasons that
ballistic missile defenses will be needed in the future.
The majority of the present generation of ballistic missiles in the Third
World are generally conventionally armed warheads that are combined with
being relatively inaccurate. However, it has been shown that they can be quite
useful for political reasons and psychological terror and can be effective against
large area targets like airfields and bases and against civilian population centers.
In the future the threat from ballistic missiles is likely to grow due to the
development and application of technology that exists today. As nations
continue to supplement their strike aircraft force with ballistic missiles, there has
been a corresponding emphasis on the development of nuclear, chemical,
biological, and advanced conventional warheads. The range, payload, and
overall technical sophistication of ballistic missiles will continue to improve.
Additionally, the introduction of terminal guidance on ballistic missiles will
provide a dramatic step jump in accuracy to these weapons. These applications
will greatly increase their utility and put many more targets, including U.S. Navy
ships, at risk.
By the year 2000, some of the nations that have or are pursuing ballistic
missiles may be able to arm their weapons with chemical, biological, nuclear, and
submunition warheads and the requisite technology is available to allow them to
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increase the range, accuracy, and lethality of their ballistic missile systems. With
that, the civilian populations of U.S. allies will become increasingly vulnerable to
these weapons. Also, forward deployed U.S. military facilities and forces, on
both land and sea, could be threatened by these weapons. The greatest risk in
the near future may be the delivery of chemical weapons, either by unitary
warhead or submunitions.
The United States government has reacted to the changing events and
threats throughout the world by proposing a new national security strategy.
This strategy recognizes the decline of what remains of the Soviet Union as a
threat and recognizes the emergence of new threats and regional crises as the
new focus of U.S. national security concerns. It is a strategy that translates
militarily into a strategy of regional contingencies. Since ballistic missiles have
proliferated to every region in the world, theater ballistic missile defenses should
be a part of that strategy.
A theater ballistic missile defense system can be an important contributor to
deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution, which are the
four fundamental pillars of the National Military Strategy. Under deterrence,
theater ballistic missile defenses ease the burden of the deterrence problem
against Third World ballistic missiles. The United States would have the
capability to defeat enemy ballistic missile attacks against cities, bases, ports, and
troops. Ballistic missile defenses can be part of U.S. peacetime engagement
through their forward presence, either on land or sea, and by being forward
deployed, particularly at sea, they can enhance U.S. crisis response capability. In
a crisis, the defenses could be used to limit escalation, for offense suppression,
and for joint task force and ground warfare support. Finally, continued research
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and development can contribute to the United States maintaining its
technological edge over all potential enemies.
The U.S. Navy has derived a new vision for the future from the National
Military Strategy. ...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century
develops a general framework for the contributions of naval forces to the new
regional defense strategy. The Navy has recognized the threat that ballistic
missiles can pose in the future. However, this thesis has shown that the defenses
can play a much bigger role across the spectrum of naval warfare in future
contingencies. As just one element of U.S. naval forces, they can contribute to the
operational capabilities needed to successfully execute the new direction of the
Navy and Marine Corps. In doing so, they can provide the task force
commander a broad area of mission assignments to which they can be tasked.
Working in coordination with land-based systems and space and air assets, they
can provide a theater-wide defense against ballistic missile attacks. The
advantages of a sea-based system lies in the fact that the Navy forces will
generally be the first into a crisis region and would have the only on-the-scene
missile defense capability and a sea-based system has the inherent mobility that
can let them cover assets that a land-based system cannot. Table 6 summarized
the missions and tasks that a sea-based defense system can provide to support
the operational capabilities of the Navy.
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TABLE 6. NAVAL TMD OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

















Force Sustainment Sealift Protection
Port Protection
The Navy has the capability to make a substantial contribution to theater
missile defense. A major part of the infrastructure is already in place with the
Aegis Combat System. It is cost effective and lower risk because there are
already existing platforms and some capability that can be upgraded to provide
an effective theater ballistic missile defense system. There are a number of
software and hardware upgrades that can be made with existing technology
right now that will help improve performance against ballistic missiles.
However, the two most critical items needed to make Aegis an effective, flexible
and mobile ballistic missile defense platform are external sources of cueing and a
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defensive warhead with proper guidance and control that can defeat all future
ballistic missile threats. Other potential problems are the 1972 ABM Treaty,
declining defense budgets, and operational tradeoffs for Aegis operating in
ballistic missile defense mode.
The fundamental question that this thesis set out to examine was: Should
the United States have theater missile defenses at sea and how can they be
employed? The answer to that question is a resounding yes, with the means to
achieve that end being the Aegis construct. Without ballistic missile defenses,
U.S. forces, allied forces and civilians, and U.S. vital interests may be at stake in
the future. The Navy should deploy a sea-based missile defense as soon as
possible. As future enhancements and critical technologies come available, they
can be rapidly integrated to provide the United States Navy with a complete
system, that when combined with other systems, will provide the United States
with an effective theater ballistic missile defense capability.
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